Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Addison Harris Lecture

Lectures

1974

Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds
John P. Dawson
Harvard University

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/harris
Part of the Legal Profession Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Dawson, John P., "Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds" (1974). Addison Harris
Lecture. 4.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/harris/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Lectures at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Addison Harris Lecture by
an authorized administrator of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

VOLUME 87

JUNE 1974

NUMBER 8

HARVARD LAW REVIEWI
LAWYERS AND INVOLUNTARY CLIENTS:
ATTORNEY FEES FROM FUNDS
John P. Dawson
Although American courts generally do not allow winning liigants

to recover their expenses'for attorneys, one escape route has been
found when their success creates or preserves a "fund" which benefits third parties not participatingin the litigation. In this Article,
Professor Dawson traces -the development of the "common fund"
mechanism, from its origins as a method of preventing .unjust enrichmext of strangers through the expenditures of active litigants, to
applicationspermitting attorneys themselves to recover compensation
from third parties in addition to that received under contracts with
clients. He concludes that the solicitude courts exhibit toward
lawyers in honoring claims so divorced from the restitution of benefits obtained through another's loss can be explained only by -special
judicial favor for fellow members of the guild.

T

HE refusal of American courts to include attorney fees in
the costs awarded .to winning litigants has been much criticized. Its main purpose supposedly is to ensure ready access to
the courts by reducing penalties for failure, but for the litigant
who prevails its effect is a partial denial of justice. For it means
that in any case where legal services are needed and used, he
must pay a substantial part of the cost of proving that his claim
or defense was just. It is no wonder that avenues of escape have
been searched for and found. The escape route that will be
examined here permits charging attorney fees to funds that have
been created, increased, or protected by successful litigation.
Funds can appear in many different forms, and in some instances may be subdivided into several minifunds. This fund
concept is employed to realize the broadly defined purpose of
recapturing unjust enrichment; As is true elsewhere this purpose,
or aspiration, .is controlled and contained by the environment
in which it operates. Strict limits have been fixed in the past by
the procedural and doctrinal setting, but when attention is concentrated on the fund, as an independent entity, its appeal, even
spell, may well be increased. This spell, however, is also, due to
*
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A preliminary 'statement of the conclusions advanced here was presented in
April, i968 in the Addison Harris Lecture Series at the Indiana University Law
School.
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the uncertain and conflicting policies behind the rule that the
fund idea circumvents.
I. POLICIES PROMOTED BY THE GRANT
OR DENIAL OF COUNSEL FEES

The standard American rule excluding counsel fees from
recoverable costs is a departure from the practice followed in
England and other European countries on which reports have been
made. No adequate historical explanation for the departure has
ever been advanced, and in any event, the reasons commonly
given -the spirit of individualism in frontier societies, the conception in earlier times of lawsuits as sporting contests, and the
widespread hostility toward lawyers - are not persuasive now.1
Even if distrust of lawyers does survive, it provides no reason for
denying indemnity to their clients.
The conflict and confusion of purposes that are still at work
are illustrated by the divergent reasons now given for changing
the rule. On the one hand it is urged that an uncertain but potential liability for an opponent's counsel fee will make a litigant
"stop and think" before commencing an action or asserting a
defense and that this would be a good thing, for it would deter
litigation and reduce court congestion. On the other hand it is
argued with passion that because of the rule many meritorious
litigants, especially the poor, are denied access to the courts by
their inability to pay the expenses of litigation and it follows that
their opponents should pay them.' The object of the latter pro1

These and related themes are discussed in the well-known article of Arthur

Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929), and in Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee:
Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REV. 75 (1963); Stoebuck, Counsel
Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 CoLo. L. REV. 202 (1966);
Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV.
1216 (1967).
2 See Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CALir. L. REV. 792 (1966). Another author has argued for a precisely opposite
conclusion -that it is the English rule, charging winners' fees to losers, that brings
disadvantage to the poor, i.e., to persons whose resources are so limited that they
"cannot take the risk of being ruined" by a suit whose costs would exceed their
capital. Goodhart, Current Judicial Reform in England, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 39g,
4o6 (1952). But it seems rather that if their claims or defenses proved to be
meritorious the poor would not be harmed but helped, since their recovery would
then be increased. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 399, 439 (i973). The economic analysis of the
latter author discloses the complexity of the variables that defeat any estimates
framed in general terms. He points out that by increasing both the rewards for
success and the penalties for failure the English practice may deter litigation and
induce more settlements, id. at 428, but that this will depend most of all on the
readiness or reluctance of those immediately concerned to take on the risks of
litigation. Id. at 438-39.
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posal quite evidently is to encourage litigation, or at any rate
some types thereof.
The dilemma posed by these arguments is obvious. If the
shifting to losers of the counsel fee expenses of winners became
the general rule and if the rule were to be administered impartially, the assurance that litigants will be relieved of these expenses if they win would carry with it the certainty that their own
expense in counsel fees will be doubled if they lose. The rule
denying winners any allowance for counsel fees rests on an unverifiable guess that more potential litigants (suitors or defendants) will be deterred by the risk of doubled costs if they lose
than will be encouraged by the prospect of indemnity if they win.
Such an assumption is strengthened by the extensive use in
chancy litigation of the contingent fee, which casts the risks of
failure on lawyers, but situations occur in which lawyers cannot
be induced to take the risks.
One response to this dilemma is to discriminate in the awarding of attorney's fees-to allow recovery of fees only by particular
kinds of winners or against particular kinds of losers. In this regard, legislatures can be selective in ways that courts, purporting
to render evenhanded justice, would find it harder to justify.
Scattered through state statutes are provisions in great variety
giving counsel fees to particular types of successful litigants, but
federal legislation on the subject has special interest.' Particularly in civil rights cases, the discretion conferred on the courts
' Such provisions of federal legislation are of two main types. The first type
openly discriminates -counsel
fees are awarded only to successful plaintiffs and
the awards are mandatory. The most important instance is the plaintiff who sues
for an antitrust violation and recovers treble damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Also
singled out for special favor are litigants suing creditors who fail to make the
finance charge disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a) (2) (1970), common carriers and certain other federally regulated utilities
that commit certain specified misdeeds or defaults, 7 U.S.C. §§ 210(f), 4999 (1970) ;
45 U.S.C. § 153(P) (,970); 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970); 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970);
49 U.S.C. §§ 16(2), go8(b), (e) (1970), and employers who pay less than the
federally legislated minimum wage, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970). See also 15 U.S.C.
§ 72 (1970) (conspiracies to dump imported commodities); 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b)
(1970) (intentional overcharging in federally financed sales to veterans).
The statutes of the second type do not, on their face, discriminate, but call for
the award of counsel fees to the "prevailing party," subject to court discretion.
Provisions of this type have long appeared in the patent, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970),
and copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 1i6 (197o), legislation. They are also included in the
civil remedies provided for violations of the federal securities laws, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k(e), 77www(a), 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970), and in the civil remedies used to
reinforce controls over internal union management, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431(c), 5oi(b)
(1970). More important nowadays is the federal civil rights legislation, which
relies heavily on private litigation to prevent or to penalize discrimination in public
accommodations, employment, and the sale or leasing of housing. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000(a)-(3)(b),

2000(e)-5(k),

3612(c)

(1970).
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can enable a sympathetic judiciary to discriminate against losing
defendants and in favor of losing plaintiffs and thus resolve the
dilemma that has inhibited more basic change elsewhere. 4
For the argument that is to follow it is important to note
that these legislative provisions all have a specific and limited
objective- to reimburse winning clients for liabilities incurred
to their lawyers. The statutes do not give or purport to give to
the lawyers themselves any independent right to an extra fee that
they can enforce against the losing party., This is equally true
of the doctrine manufactured by federal courts allowing awards
of attorney fees against litigants who have engaged in fraudulent,
groundless, or vexatious conduct in causing or conducting federal
court litigation. This doctrine represents another sharp reaction
against the rule denying counsel fees to winners. It has been
applied freely by the federal. courts, in a very wide range of civil
litigation,' but its object,*like that of the special legislation mentioned, is to save winning clients harmless from the costs they
incurred in winning, not to give lawyers rewards of their ownmost specially, not extra rewards.
It thus appears that the exclusion of attorney fees from recoverable costs expresses no solidly supported judgment of policy,
and rests on a highly debatable calculus of probabilities. In particular, it seems clear that no policy is undermined by allowing
recovery where the claim for reimbursement can be deflected
'The use of attorney fees to promote the purposes of federal civil rights legislation has been much discussed. See, e.g., Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public
Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301 (1973); Note, Awarding of Attorneys'
Fees in School Desegregation Cases: Demise of the Bad-Faith Standard, 39
BROOILYN L. REV. 371 (,972); Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private
Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public

Interest, 24

HASTINGs

L.J. 733 (973).

' This is clear enough in the statutory language and was strongly affirmed in
First Iowa Hydro Elec. Co-op v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 630
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (I957). Here the attorneys for a plaintiff in
an antitrust damage action claimed an interest in the litigation by virtue of their
contract for a contingent fee and appealed on that ground, unsuccessfully, from
dismissal of the action.
Some slight doubt is raised as to civil rights cases by the dicta in Miller v.
Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1970). There the question
was whether an award of attorney fees was precluded if there was no evidence
that the successful plaintiffs were obligated to pay an attorney fee. The court in
Bell v. Alamatt Motel, 243 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Miss. 1965) (alternate holding),
had held that in that. case no fee should be awarded, but the Fifth Circuit in the
Miller ease disagreed. judge Brown added that the court itself would "assure"
that the fee, when fixed, would go to the lawyer, not the client. I. at 539. Further
discussion appears in Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87
HAIv. L. REv. 411; 421-22 (1973).

6See 6

3. MOORE,

FEDERAL PRACTICE

f1 54.77[21, at 1709-I1 & n.I7 (2d ed.

1974); Annot., 8 L. Ed. 2d 894, 912-13 (1963).
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toward a stranger - where a litigant, suing on a cause of action
of his own, has succeeded and it then appears that his success has
ensured gains of nonparty strangers. He will be denied recovery
from his opponent of his out-of-pocket loss in counsel fees, even
though it was his opponent's resistance that caused this loss,
mainly because of the deterrent effect on litigation generally if
all of its real costs were regularly shifted to losers. But such
reasoning is entirely irrelevant to a claim against a complete outsider, to recapture some part of the windfall to him. If the outsider were to object that the successful litigant is a self-serving
intermeddler in his affairs (as he undoubtedly is), that is answered by the fact that at times our attitude toward such intermeddlers is distinctly favorable. In the case supposed a claim to
recover unjust enrichment could be framed as a claim of the
enterprising litigant to enforce contribution to costs that he had
necessarily incurred in bringing gains to himself and necessarily,
without any element of altruism, to others. Where interests are
intertwined and united to this degree, the aspiration of preventing
enrichment of one through another's loss awaits only a favorable
opportunity to reassert itself.7
II. ORIGINS OF THE COMMON FUND
The "common fund" as a source of counsel fees has been created, almost single-handedly, by the United States Supreme Court.
The landmark decisions of that Court will be sketched in this
section, up to the point where this contrivance, with impetus and
fuel supplied from the same source, took off from the launching
pad and headed off toward destinations that are as yet unknown.
The first landmark case, Trustees v. Greenouglz,8 nearly a
century ago presented the claim for restitution in a way that was
as appealing as one could well imagine. The state of Florida had
conveyed to trustees more than ten million acres of state-owned
land to provide security for a bond issue of the Florida Railroad
Co. The trustees had collusively sold hundreds of thousands of
acres at nominal prices and had failed to provide reserves for
payment of interest and principal on the bonds. Vose, a large
holder of the Railroad Company's bonds, sued to set aside the
transfer as fraudulent and for the appointment of a receiver.
After eleven years of litigation at his own expense he had recaptured the looted assets and secured large payments to the
bondholders, which they had accepted.
Vose, the client, then presented a claim for reimbursement of
7 Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler,87 HAv. L. REv. 1409, 1418 (x974).
8 105 U.S.527 (18k).
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his lawyers' fees. The residue of the restored trust estate was
still being administered by a receiver under the trial court's direction in the interest of the bondholders, so there was a fund
under the court's "control" that could be tapped. As the Supreme
Court pointed out, if the trustees themselves had rightfully incurred these expenses in retrieving the assets for the trust, the
expenses would have been chargeable to the trust estate, which by
familiar rules must "bear the expenses of its own administration"; I Vose had merely performed the trustees' duty. The Court
concluded that to deny Vose contribution to the costs he had
incurred 10

would not only be unjust to him, but it would give to the other
parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund an unfair
advantage. He has worked for them as well as for himself; .. .
[t]hey ought to contribute their due proportion of the expenses
which he has fairly incurred. To make them a charge upon the
fund is the most equitable way of securing such contribution.
The Court in Greenough, however, drew a sharp distinction
between lawyer and client. While Vose, the active litigant, was
held to be entitled to a "charge" for the reasonable value of his
lawyers' services, which the lower court would fix with a wide
discretion, it had no discretion to award an allowance to Vose
himself for his own time and expenses. He was a creditor who
sued to promote his own interest and it would present too'great a
temptation to litigants to "intermeddle" in the management of
funds "if they could calculate upon the allowance of a salary for
their time and of having all their private expenses paid." 11 The
Greenough case has been followed in this as in other ways. The
recovery allowed is for services by lawyers. I know of no case
that uses the Greenough doctrine to reimburse the litigants themselves for their own time, travel, or personal expenses, however
necessary their efforts may have been to litigation that conferred
gains on others.'
The second landmark case, Central Railroad & Banking Co.

v. Pettus,1 3 moved beyond Greenough in that the claim on the
9 Id.at 532.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 538.
12 The only other case discovered in which this issue was even discussed was

the taxpayer's action in Homer v. Chamber of Commerce, 236 N.C. 96, 72 S.E.2d
21 (1952), where the taxpayer was awarded contribution to his attorney fees but
the court in dictum said that he was not entitled to an allowance for his own time
and effort since he should not "capitalize on the suit." 236 N.C. at 1x, 72 S.E.2d
at 24-25.
13 113 U.S.

ix6

(1885).
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"fund' was asserted in that case not by a client, but directly by
attorneys. The original action,' 4 a creditors' bill brought in an
Alabama state court to reach the assets of the debtor, a railroad,
had been framed as a class action. After the action succeeded, the
lawyers sought to recover for the services they had provided to
inactive class members. In response to the objection that petitioning attorneys had already received the agreed fee for their services
from their clients and should recover no more, the Supreme Court
deemed it enough to say that the attorneys had throughout intended to charge fees of all other creditors who took advantage
of the decree and that otherwise they would have charged their
own clients more. As to the absence of any agreements between

the attorneys and the passive members of the class, the Court
said merely that these members knew the action was a class action

brought in part for their protection and, as in the Greenough case,

"every ground of justice" called for payment by those who "accepted the fruits" of the labors of others.' 5 To secure their right
to an extra fee, the lawyers were given a lien on the railroad assets
that had been salvaged by the decree and made available to satisfy the creditors' claims. In the event of nonpayment of the
extra fee the lien was to be enforced by sale of these salvaged
assets.16

The Court seemed to be cheerfully unaware that it had leaped
across a gulf. The Greenough case three years before had approved the claim of a client for contribution to the litigation costs
that he had incurred but under the usual rule could not recover
from his losing opponents. The Pettus case totally transformed
this into an independent right of the lawyer, reinforced by lien,
to an extra reward so that he might share the wealth of strangers.
The lawyer was suddenly thought of as producer of this wealth,
14 Montgomery & W.P.R.R. v. Branch, Sons & Co., 59 Ala. 139 (877).

15 X13 US. at 127.
1
The lien given by the decree of the Federal Circuit Court for the Middle
District of Alabama, and approved by the Supreme Court, was on the roadbed,
depots, trestles, and bridges owned by the original debtor, the Montgomery and
West Point Railroad. These fixed assets had been transferred successively to the
Western Railroad and then to two Georgia corporations which at the time of the
decree, and apparently also at the time of its approval by the Supreme Court,
were still operating the railroad. See id. at 117. There was the further difficulty
that the original creditors' bill was still pending before the Alabama state court
and the only issue removed to the federal court (through diversity of citizenship)
was the lawyers' petition for an additional fee. It seems quite plain that the federal
court, foreclosing the lien, would have no means to determine priorities as between
the lawyers and the creditors of the railroad and that there would not be much
left for trains to run on if these fixed assets were sold. It seems safe to infer that
the Supreme Court considered the lawyers' lien to come first and to be enforceable
even if the "fund" were dissipated so as to leave nothing for the nonclient creditors
that the lawyers' services had supposedly benefited.
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though he did nothing more than perform his contract with his
own client, and furthermore had been paid by 'his client in full
the sum he had agreed to accept. The only explanation for this
surprising result must be that the Court was bemused by the
thought that the lawyers were the single-handed and primary
benefactors.17 For then and ever since if anyone other than a
lawyer had presented such a farfetched claim, no court would be
bemused by the appeal to unjust enrichment. Under the usual
formula of enrichment through another's loss, it would be difficult
indeed for the claimants in the Pettus case to contend that they
had suffered any loss at all, since they had been paid by their
clients the full contract price for their services. 8 Prior to that
case, state courts had held that even attorneys had no claim
against strangers, nonclients, for the profit from the lawyer's
services. 19 This view continued to reappear for some time thereafter in state court decisions.20 As will be seen shortly it is always
held in reserve and is promptly reasserted when there is no "fund"
available to trigger the Greenough-Pettusmachinery.
In the Pettus *case, in order to justify giving the lawyerclaimants a lien on the assets that had been salvaged by the
creditors' bill, the Court cited two Alabama decisions which
allowed .lawyers "charging" liens on judgments that their services
17 The only clue on this point in Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court is his

statement that the recovery ensured to the nonclient creditors "was due to the
skill and. vigilance of the [petitioning attorneys], so far as the result of litigation
may, in any case, be referred to the labors of counsel." Id. at 126.
18 See Dawson, supra note 7, at 1444-57 (discussing gains to strangers through
performance of the producer's own contract; in those situations, claims of enrichment, uniformly rejected, were made somewhat more plausible by the likelihood
that the producer would suffer a loss through the default of his own contract
partner).
1" Chicago, St. Charles & M.R.R. v. Lamed, 26 Ill. 2r8 (i86x) ; Jones v. Woods,
76 Pa. 408 (1874); Hand v. Savannah & -Charleston R.R., 21 S.C. 262 (1883).
In Grimball v. Cruse, 7o Ala. 534 (i88x), the court in dicta conceded that with
creditors' bills, where a fund is brought within court control, lawyers' fees should
be deducted from the shares of inactive creditors who benefit. But the case itself
was a proceeding to construe a will in which attorneys for two distributees established a construction that ensured inheritance by other distributees similarly
situated. An allowance to the lawyers, payable out of the shares of the inactive
distributees, was denied with the comment:
To travel beyond the parties making the contract, in search of an implied
promise to pay for such incidental benefit, would introduce a new and
dangerous principle in implied contracts, the extent of which it is difficult to
conjecture.
Id. at 544.
201n re Estate of Officer, 122 Iowa 553, 98 N.W. 314 (i9o4); Forman v.
Sewerage & Water Bd., 229 La. 49, 43 So. 908 (1907); Succession of Kernan,
xo5 La. 592, 30 So. 239 (go); McGraw v. Canton, 74 Md. 554, 22 A. 132 (189i);
Rives v. Patty, 74 Miss. 381, 20 So. 862 (1896); Mayfield v. McKnight, 56 S.W. 42
(Tenn. Ct. Ch. App. 1899).
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helped to procure. 21 The "charging" lien, a security device manufactured by American 'courts in aid of lawyers, is widely recognized in American law but as normally applied, and as previously
applied in Alabama, it merely reinforced claims of lawyers against
their own clients. 2 Being persuaded that Greenough controlled,
the Pettus court could, without hesitation, apply this device rooted
in contract against third parties with no contractual obligation.

And so the machinery was perfected and depersonalized.

The

lawyers' claim was not against strangers to the contract with their

own client, indeed it was not against people at all. It was a charge
on a "fund," which could be seized and sold if it did not pay. This
line of thought, of course, conceals the Hobson's choice confronting the owners of the fund: the only way they could escape paying
the lawyers was to abandon their own shares in the fund.
Even if lawyers were to be given liens on strangers' shares in
funds, there was no inevitable logic to dictate that they should
recover an extra fee, in addition to that due from their own
clients.3 It is possible to think of the "fund" as a form of secu-

rity, available as an ultimate recourse to cover any deficit in the
payment due the lawyer from his client. This view has been

adopted in one case.

The lawyer's claim would then be deriva-

tive and would simply reinforce the purpose of the Greenough
result, which was to compel contribution to the litigation costs of
the client. For it could be argued that it was the merit of the
21

Ex parte Lehmann, Durr & Co., 59 Ala. 631 (1877); Warfield v. Campbell,

38 Ala.
527 (1863).
22
Ex parte Lehmann, Durr & Co., 59 Ala. 631 (1877); Warfield'v. Campbell,
38 Ala. 527 (1863); 2 E. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON AT NOPu
ys AT LAW §§ 578-98
(0914); Wentworth, Attorneys' Lien-A Survey and a Proposal, 35 CONN. B.J.
x91 (1961). But in the absence of statute, liens on physical assets (land or goods)
recovered for the client are usually not awarded. See Annot., 93 A.L.R. 667 (934).
23 In the Pettus case, of course, there would have been no contest if they had
not demanded more, since the fees due from the clients to the lawyer-petitioners
had already been fully paid.
24 In Maurer v. International Re-insurance Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 456, 95 A.2d 827
(1953), some insurance companies that had re-insured their risks with International
established that they and other re-insurers were entitled to share in a trust fund
set up to secure "policyholders." Maurer, attorney for the active litigants, sought
a charge on the trust fund for his services. The Supreme Court of Delaware conceded that under the Pettus case payment of a "common fund" could be ordered
directly to an attorney, but asserted that this was only for convenience, and that
any claim belonged to the client, for contribution to the client's costs in order to
relieve him of the "burden of the costs of litigation" and should be asserted in the
client's name; otherwise the lawyer would be paid twice and unjustly enriched. Id.
at 463, 95 A.2d at 831.
It should be noted that persons other than lawyers have uniformly failed in
efforts to make up deficits in the returns due from their contract partners by
recouping value they have added to assets owned by third parties. Dawson, supra
note 7, at 1458.
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client's claim, which the lawyer was under a duty to demonstrate,
that produced the benefit to others. Indeed the conception of the
client as producer of the benefit is firmly rooted in the Greenough
case and has by no means disappeared. Though claims against
"funds" are asserted overwhelmingly by lawyers on their own
behalf, clients do occasionally sue. It is agreed everywhere that
if a Greenough-type fund can be found, the client can assert in
his own name a claim for contribution to his costs against the fund
that his litigation has "created, increased, or protected." 25
The net result is that either client or lawyer can secure a
charge on a Greenough-type fund for legal services rendered in
successful litigation. In the rare case where the client sues it is
taken for granted, and Greenough itself implied, that the claim
25 The following list of 28 successful claims of clients for contribution, if not

complete, is nearly so: Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. I61 (1939); Cole
v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972); Thomas v. Honeybrook Mines, Inc., 428 F.2d
98I (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971); Gibbs v. Blackwelder, 346
F.2d 943 (4 th Cir. 1965); Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 326 F.2d 246 (2d
Cir. 1964); Walsh v. National Savings & Trust Co., 247 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 2957);
Carbon Steel Co. v. Slayback, 31 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1929) ; Bright v. PhiladelphiaBaltimore-Washington Stock Exch., 327 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 197); Brown v.
T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., io5 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Washington Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Hammett, 237 Ark. 954, 377 S,W.2d 811 (1964); Farmers' &
Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Peterson, 5 Cal. 2d 6oi, 55 P.2d 867 (936) ; In re Estate
of Lundell, 107 Cal. App. 2d 463, 237 P.2d 62 (95I) ; Pensioners Protective Ass'n
v. Davis, 122 Colo. 535, i50 P.2d 974 (1944); Phillips v. Liberty Mut, Ins, Co., 253
A.2d 502 (Del. 1969); Lovrien v. Fitzgerald, 245 Iowa 1325, 66 N.W.2d 458 (1954);
Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Stanley, igo Ky. 762, 228 S.W. 69x (2921); Louisville
Presbyterian Theological Seminary v. Botto, 117 Ky. 962, 80 S.W. 177 (2904);
Helm v. Smith-Fee Co., 79 Minn. 297, 81 N.W. 542 (I9oo); Swedish-American
Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 71 Minn. 508, 74 N.W. 286 (2898); White v. University Land
Co., 49 Mo. App. 450 (1892); Allen v. Omaha, 136 Neb. 620, 286 N.W. 916
(I939); Peterson v. John J. Reilly, Inc., Io5 N.H. 340, 2oo A.2d 21 (1964);
Klacik v. Kovacs, zii N.J. Super. 307, 268 A.2d 305 (970); Homer v, Chamber
of Commerce, 236 N.C. 96, 72 S.E.2d 21 (1952); Kinney v. Uglow, 163 Ore. 539,
98 P.2d ioo6 (1940); In re Estate of Engebretson, 68 S.D. 255, 1 N.W.2d 351
(94i); State ex rel. Bonner v. Andrews, 131 Tenn. 554, 175 S.W. 563 (1915);
Tennessee United Paint Store, Inc. v. D.H. Overmyer Warehouse Co., 62 Tenn.
App. 721, 467 S.W.2d 8o6 (1971), cert. denied, 467 S.W.2d 8o6 (Tenn. 2972). Stockholders' derivative suits have peculiar features and must be dealt with separately.
The solution in In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 318 F. Supp. 42X
(E.D.N.Y. 1970), seems to be unique -the
lawyer, not the client, presented the
claim, but the fee awarded the lawyer out of the "fund" was ordered paid directly
to his client as reimbursement for the fee already paid by the client. Id. at 433.
It may be in some of these cases that the client's name was used as a matter
of form, the real object being to secure an additional fee for his lawyer. This seems
to be true of Carbon Steel Co. v. Slayback, supra, and Smith v. Kroeger, 138
Ohio St. 508, 37 N.E.2d 45 (I941).
It clearly was the object in the analogous case
of Hopkins v. Cohen, 39o U.S. 530 (1968), which did not involve a "fund."
The only case'I have found in which both client and lawyer joined in the
application for a fee for the lawyer is In re Estate of Merica, 99 Neb. 229, 155 N.W.
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for legal services is a first charge on the fund and must be satisfied before any distribution occurs.26 The same priority is assumed for the lawyer's own claim when asserted independently,
and where the issue of priority rises to the surface this is made
explicit." The lawyer's claim is independent in the sense that he
can assert it, though foreclosure of his lien may destroy the fund 28
or so deplete it that there is nothing left to pay his o*n client.2 9
He can assert his claim though he has agreed with his client to
serve the client gratuitously.30 It has even been held that where
the client's petition for contribution to his own outlay in attorney
fees was brought first and denied, the denial did not operate as
res judicata to bar the lawyer's separate claim for a fee, chargeable to the fund."This priority accorded to the claims of both client and lawyer,
however, does not explain the triumphant progress of the "common fund" that originated in Greenough and Pettus. Its primary
attraction clearly lies in the device it provides for awarding extra
fees to lawyers. It is tempting to explain the progress of this
idea through accidents of litigation - two cases decided only three
years apart by a court with a nationwide audience, the first case
(Greenough) extremely appealing on its facts and in the limited
purpose it set forth (contribution to litigation costs, not reimbursable otherwise, incurred by a litigant whose success brought
gains to others); the second case (Pettus) then slipping past
under the protective fog of the first. But accident, if it played a
part, does not explain the enthusiasm with which the message of
Pettus was received. It is constantly restated with fervor which is
at times reinforced by the Bible. Strangers who resist paying
lawyers for services that have brought them benefits inspire judicial indignation, which is not expended on behalf of intermeddlers
of other professions: "It is repugnant to fundamental principles
887 (I915), but the object here seems to have been, again, to secure not contribution for the client but an extra fee for the lawyer.
26 Carbon Steel Co. v. Slayback, 31 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1929); Farmers' Bank &
Trust Co. v. Stanley, i9o Ky. 762, 228 S.W. 691
Inc., io5 N.H. 340, 200 A.2d 21 (x964).

(1929);

Peterson v. John

J. Reilly,

21 Winslow v. Harold G. Ferguson Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 274, 153 P.2d 714 (1944)
(priority prevailing over not only the claims of other creditors but also the lien
of the federal government for income taxes); see United States v. Hubbell, 323
F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1963); Columbia Cas. Co. v. Consolidated Shipping Co., 276
F. Supp. 6oo (E.D. La. 1967).
2
This was at least a possibility in the Pettus case if the lien given the lawyers
was foreclosed by sale. See note 16 supra.
21 See Campbell v. Provident Say. & Loan Soc'y, 6i S.W. io9o (Tenn. Ct.,
Ch. App. i900).
' 0 See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 195 F.2d 29, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 195X).
"1Wallace v. Fiske, 8o F.2d 897, 909-12 (8th Cir. 1936).
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of equity... that they should reap where they have not sown." 3
It seems that these two decisions tapped some deeper streams of
emotion. The case law that has grown out of Greenough and
Pettus expresses a conviction, widely held among judges and
lawyers, at least, that lawyers have a right that is denied to all
the rest of the population," to share the wealth of strangers that
their services have produced.
It is clear that such claims of lawyers against strangers cannot
be explained as a product of express contract. In the client's
remedy for contribution, as authorized by the Greenough case,
there is at least a remote connection with express contract in that
the client's contractual liability to his lawyer sets a ceiling on the
litigation costs that are to be shared. But the lawyer's remedy,
introduced by the Pettus case, must be conceived as a form of
wholly extra-contractual restitution. It does not aim, of course,
to recapture all the gain that the strangers realize. That there be
a gain is a requirement but, as we shall see, it need not be measured by economic tests and can take peculiar shapes that would
not fit in any other type of restitution. The fee fixed in the contract of the lawyer with his own client is usually not mentioned
but in any event clearly should not control.34 His recovery is
presumably measured by the market value of the services rendered, but the market for services by lawyers in risky litigation
is dominated and pervaded by contingent fees. In the absence of
a governing contract, fixing fees is a function of judges, not juries,
and judicial valuation of lawyers' services employs a medley of
shifting and unrelated variables.3 One of the variables that is
2
Petition of Crum, i96 S.C. 528, 533, 14 S.E.2d 2I, 24 (194).
a See Dawson, supra note 7, at 1458.

3 Holding that it does not control: Little Rock Road Macb. Co. v. Light,
240 Ark. 1012, 403 S.W.2d 726 (1966); G.M. Dykes Iron Works, Inc. v. Dehenffe,
131 So. 2d 760 (Fla. Ct. App. 296i); Webster County Soil Conserv. Dist. v.
Shelton, 437 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1969); In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co., 235
La. 825, xo6 So. 2d. 276 (1958) ; cf. In re Faling's Estate, 113 Ore. 6, 228 P. 821
(1924).

The only significant group of cases that carries over the contingent fee arrangements with clients to claims against nonclients are the subrogated insurer cases.
See notes 82, 85 infra.
" One of the statements most quoted is that of Judge Woolsey in In re Osofsky,
50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), describing as elements to be considered:
(i) The time which has fairly and properly to be used in dealing with the
case; because this represents the amount of work necessary.
(2) The quality of skill which the situation facing the attorney demanded.
(3) The skill employed in meeting that situation.
(4) The amount involved; because that determines the risk of the client and
the commensurate responsibility of the lawyer.
(5) The result of the case, because that determines the real benefit to the
client.
(6) The eminence of the lawyer at the bar, or in the specialty in which he
may be practicing.
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usually and prominently mentioned is "the result obtained" as a
measure of the benefit to those lawyers serve.3 6 Understood in
economic terms, this logically implies that a diminished recovery
means a scaled down fee.3 7 But in the overwhelming majority of
cases the stress is laid on the gains to "funds" through successful
litigation and has the effect of magnifying fees. So this strange
hybrid form of restitution ends up, not as an accounting to the
lawyer for whatever profit results from "his" litigation, but as a
profit-sharing scheme with the shares determined by judges under
variable and uncertain standards.
Most of this was still in the future at the time of the Greenough
and Pettus cases. Though they fixed the main lines that have
been followed since, for frequency of quotation they have both
been displaced by a third case decided by the United States
Supreme Court, Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank.38 It is quoted
not for its decision but for some sweeping dicta. The case was
one of the rarities where a client sued, seeking contribution for
litigation expenses, including counsel fees.3 9 In fact there was
already in existence a clearly identified fund, bonds that had been
set aside and earmarked as the subject of an express trust previously created; the only complication was that there were fourteen beneficiaries with no allocation of any bonds to any of them
in particular. Sprague sued and established her own right as one
of the beneficiaries to a lien on the proceeds of the bonds, which
had been sold in the meantime by a receiver. Having established
her right to share in the proceeds along with the other cestuis que
trust, she then sought an allowance for her counsel fees, to be
paid out of the same money proceeds.
It would have been enough to cite the Greenough case, but
Justice Frankfurter seized the occasion to speak expansively on
the historic powers of equity courts to award counsel fees.40
Each case, of course, differs to some extent from every other case in respect of the importance of these several elements.
See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNSIBILiTY, Ethical Consideration No.
2-18:

The fees of a lawyer will vary according to many factors, including the
time required, his experience, ability and reputation, the nature of the
employment, the responsibility- involved, and the results obtained.
Two extensive annotations classify these and other elements that are mentioned
in reported cases. Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 13, 31-36 (1957) ; Annot., 143 A.L.R. 672,
693-700 (1943). Where little work is needed, the size of the fund is not controlling.
See, e.g., Allen v. City of Omaha, 136 Neb. 620, 286 N.W. 916 (ig39).
" See sources cited note 35 supra.
7 In re Continental Vending Mach. Co., 318 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.N.Y. 1970);
Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Brown, 79 Md. 442, 29 A. 524 (894).
28307 U.S. z6x (1939).

a See pp. 16o6-07 & note 26 supra.
40.307 U.S. at 164-67.
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Though the issue had not been raised below, 41 he then noted that

Sprague had not brought her action as a class action so that the
other thirteen beneficiaries had not had their rights established
by the decree in her favor. On this point he commented: 42
Whether one professes to sue representatively or formally makes
a fund available for others may, of course, be a relevant circumstance in making the fund liable for his costs in producing it. But
when such a fund is for all practical purposes created for the
benefit of others, the formalities of the litigation - the absence
of an avowed class suit or the creation of a fund, as it were,
through stare decisis rather than through a decree- hardly
touch the power of equity in doing justice as between a party and
the beneficiaries of his litigation.
This statement could be read narrowly as meaning merely that
the availability of a "fund" for recovery of fees is not limited to
those cases where the beneficiaries can rely on the present suit
as res judicata. This point must be discussed further in the next
section but it has for long been plain enough. In the context, as
a part of a sweeping assertion of the inherent power of equity
courts to redistribute the costs of litigation, wider-reaching inferences have been drawn. Open-ended terms like "others" and
"for all practical purposes," and reliance on stare decisis as the
connecting link, have made a great impression. If stare decisis is
enough to "create" a fund, why should it be necessary that the
claims of the winning litigant and his "beneficiary" be directed
against the same opponent? For example, McPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.4 3 is well remembered as a long step in the direction of

product liability. Could McPherson's lawyer, if still alive, have
liens on all the money judgments recovered by injured consumers
who have since prevailed through the effect of that case as a
precedent? Could the lawyers for the plaintiffs in the Sprague
case itself retire to Bimini while the money rolls in? In that case
no such extravagant notions were required, since all the claims of
fourteen identified persons were directed against a common opponent, whose predecessor had clearly segregated specific bonds
and declared them subject to an express trust. All that needed to
be said was that the court's receiver, who had acquired custody
4 The district court had dismissed the Sprague petition, though its purpose

was only to secure reimbursement for counsel fees, on the ground that the Supreme
Court in affirming an earlier decree in her favor had sent the case back with a
mandate that did not provide for any supplementary proceeding. Id. at 163-64.
The Circuit Court of Appeals had added the further reason that the term of court
had expired. Id. at 164. The Supreme Court held that neither factor presented
any obstacle. Id. at 163-64, 170.
42
Id. at 167.
43 217 N.Y. 382, i1 N.E. i050 (igi6).
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of these and other assets of the bank, had both the means and the
duty to ensure that all fourteen beneficiaries of the trust were
treated alike.
The growth of the superstructure erected on Greenough-Pettus
has not ended with the dicta in Sprague. It is worth noting now,
however, that the superstructure that has risen so high has a base
that is extremely narrow. It covers only services by lawyers and
by no other members of the population. And very seldom indeed
has it been allowed to include any services by lawyers other than
the conduct, or at least the commencement, of litigation. 4 The
only court to hold that lobbying by lawyers meets the test is the
United States Supreme Court itself and that in only one case.45
Out of the many hundreds of cases that have used the GreenoughPettus doctrine to justify fee awards to lawyers, there have been
perhaps seven or eight that have found it sufficient that the lawyer
threatened suit, without actual start of suit.4
But the start of suit, even securing a favorable judgment, will
" Litigation before an administrative agency was held to be included in Powell
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. i959), where the proceeding had ended
with an enforceable order for payment of money, and in Honda v. Mitchell, 419
F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1969), where the proceeding ended in a settlement.
"'Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373 (1921). Here the Supreme Court declared
that if a "benefit" could be proved, lawyers could recover for services in lobbying
in Congress and before executive departments of the federal government to secure
allotments of land to Choctaw Indians in Mississippi. Congress had passed a
special statute authorizing actions "on the principle of quantum meruit" to be
brought in the U.S. Court of Claims by the four lawyers who had engaged in these
activities, but the Supreme Court declared emphatically that its own prior decisions
awarding liens on funds preserved or augmented through professional legal services
established principles that applied just as much to success in securing legislation
as they did to successful litigation. Id. at 393.
Lobbying services were among the numerous activities, including litigation, that
were lumped together in computing compensation in Louisiana State Mineral Bd.
v. Abadie, 164 So. 2d I59 (La. Ct. App. 1964). But see Whittier v. Emmet, 281
F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 196o) ("The assertion of a noncontractual claim for compensation for services rendered in sponsoring favorable legislation does not deserve
prolonged discussion").
"' An exception to the requirement that suit be started that seems to be on
the way to general acceptance is the case of a stockholder whose lawyer notifies
the corporation that a corporate officer has taken short-swing profits which the
stockholder cannot sue to recover unless the corporation fails to act. Notice to
the corporation, without suit, has been held to justify a counsel fee award where
the corporation thereafter proceeds to recover the profits, also without suit.
Blau v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., 389 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1968); Gilson v. Chock Full
O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964); Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co.,
7 F.R.D. 195 (E.D.N.Y. X947), noted in 6o HARv. L. REV. 835 (i947).
For four other decisions (or perhaps three and one-half) that seem to be clear
aberrations, see notes 93, 95 infra. The peculiar results reached in corporate stockholders' derivative actions and in some class actions must be postponed for later
discussion.
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not be enough if for any reason the tests derived from Greenough
are not met -if no fund can be found or it has been dissipated
or has received no sufficient benefit - then lawyers are told what
the rest of the population is told: 4' if the services are rendered
under a contract, payment must come from your contract partner;
strangers are not liable for these "incidental"
benefits, even when
48
produced through litigation by a lawyer.
The discussion that follows will be centered on litigation that
serves purely private interests. The Greenough and Pettus cases
themselves will appear as prototypes, though many other types
of "funds" will appear incidentally. Litigation aimed in greater
degree at promoting public interests - the taxpayer's action,
other public interest litigation, especially that in the class action
form, and the peculiar hybrid, -the corporate stockholder's derivative suit -will be omitted almost entirely. They must be discussed eventually, 9 for it is in these other contexts (especially
the last) that funds and "common benefit" have begun to skitter
over the landscape.
III. MEANS OF CREATING FUNDS

It is clear that benefits can *be conferred on funds of the
Greenough-Pettustype without the use of class actions or any of
5 0
the formal rules of res judicata.
In some instances, as in the
Greenough case itself, litigation has been formally brought "on
behalf of" others and it could be that a decree in such cases would
operate through res judicata to establish rights in passive beneficiaries. But for many years after Greenough the res judicata
effect of a decree in a class action depended on distinctions between true, mixed and "spurious" types that made results extremely obscure and unpredictable.5 1 In most instances the class
"See generally Dawson, supra note 7.
See, e.g., Coleman v. United States, 152 U.S. 96 (z894); Preston v. United

4

States, 284 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. ig6o) ; Jett v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 228 F.2d
z56 (4th Cir. i955); Lamar v. Hall & Wimberly, 129 F. 79 (5th Cir. 1904); Lewis
v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 256 Ala. 430, 54 So. 2d 777 (1951); Commercial Union
Ins. Co. v. Scott, ii6 Ga. App. 633, i58 S.E.2d 295 (1967); Bartholomew v.
Union Trust Co., 36 Ind. App. 328, 75 N.E. 31 (i9o5); Spinner v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co., 245 Ky. 519, 53 S.W.2d 946 (1932); Barrett v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 152 Md.
253, 136 A. 542 (1927); Williams v. Gratton, 136 Ore. 224, 298 P. 231 (x931);
Rankin v. Superior Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 380, 117 S.E.2d 525 (196o).
I will discuss attorney fees in public interest litigation in a future article.
'oUnited States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 466
F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 195 F.2d 29
(D.C. Cir. x951) (making this explicit); Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v.
Peterson, 5 Cal. 2d 6oi, 55 P.2d 867 (1936) (same) ; Petition of Crum, 196 S.C. 528,
14 S.E.2d 21 (194I) (same).
"' See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments oj
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure (1), 8 HARv. L. REV. 356, 376-86 (1967).
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action form was not used at all and in some clearly could not be,
if only because the class was too small.
In some states it might be possible nowadays to invoke collateral estoppel, the modern extension of res judicata. The objection to collateral estoppel that for a time seemed fatal was the
lack of "mutuality" if a sfranger to a lawsuit was permitted to
take advantage, and assert the preclusive effect, of a decision that
would not have been binding on him if it had gone the other way.
The discussion of this issue centered first on the defensive use of
collateral estoppel, where a defendant seeks to estop the plaintiff
from relitigating an issue which had been determined against him
in a prior action against a different defendant, and tries to show
that the adverse decision requires determination of an issue that
is central to his own liability. Defensive use, which has made
steady progress in the last forty years, would not contribute much
in the situations here considered since it presupposes that a prior
action has failed, whereas the Greenough doctrine presupposes
that the prior action succeeded. Extremely relevant but much
more disputed is the offensive or affirmative use of collateral
estoppel to fortify a claim of a plaintiff in a situation where a
prior action, brought by a different plaintiff, has succeeded. Such
offensive use has made only irregular progress for several reasons.5" In 1967 the New York Court of Appeals approved it with
emphasis and stated sweepingly that the doctrine of mutuality is
a "dead letter," though important qualifications were added
later.5 3 But in other recent decisions offensive use of collateral
"The

advantages of preventing relitigation - economy of effort and consis-

tency of results - aygue in favor of permitting offensive estoppel. But plaintiffs
have choices that defendants do not and it is not quite so evident that sidelinesitters who do have choices should be free to abstain from litigation brought by
one or a few, but take full advantage if the litigation succeeds and suffer no
prejudice if it fails. Also, troublesome problems may arise as to whether the
relative unimportance of the interests at stake led the defendant to relax his effort
and, conversely, whether magnifying the consequences of defeat may induce
defendants to prolong litigation and exploit every resource for contesting against
them.
Discussion in the law reviews of both defensive and offensive use of collateral
estoppel has swollen to a torrent. Influential articles were written by Brainerd
Currie. See Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrilne, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews,
53 CAin'. L. REV. 25 (x965). Especially helpful are Semmel, Collateral Estoppel,
Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 CoLum. L. REV. 1457 (1968); Note, The
Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty,
35 GEo. WASH. L. Rv.ioio (1967).
"aB.R. Dewitt, Inc. v. Hall, i9N.Y.2d 141, 22S N.E.2d 9ig(1967). The court
stated that the first action was defended with full vigor and opportunity to be
heard, and that the defendant offered no reason why he should not be estopped.
In dicta the New York Court of Appeals said subsequently in Schwartz v. Public
Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 7X, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729 (x969), that it had adopted a "full
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estoppel has been rejected altogether. 4 Its future elsewhere is
shrouded in doubt.
In a large percentage of the situations that will be reviewed
in this Article collateral estoppel in its offensive form could have
been used by a court that accepted it, but it has emerged too
recently to have played any part in establishing the doctrine of
the "common fund." In any event, the Greenough-Pettus machinery, when invoked, aims at a different target. Unlike collateral
estoppel in its affirmative or offensive form its effect is not to aid
in establishing an additional liability of a defendant who has
already suffered one defeat. On the contrary it operates only
when the litigation against the original opponent has been finally
concluded and then fastens on the fall-out gains that have accrued
to outsiders. Surely a looser test than whether estoppel is available is appropriate in determining what outsiders come within the
range of the fall-out and to what extent. When this issue has been
determined there comes a second stage in which the role of courts
can be important. For in some ninety-eight percent of the cases,
where the claim for counsel fees is advanced by lawyers, not
clients, the terms agreed to between lawyer and client will not
control and the fee to be awarded must be judicially determined.
More important, means must be found for allocating the litigation
costs, thus determined, in some reasonable proportion to benefits
conferred. It is supposedly for these reasons that "court control"
is often named as an essential cog in the machinery. It is clear,
however, that control is often remote or indirect. Whether it is
essential is one of the questions to be asked.
The prototype of a fund, illustrated by the Greenough case
itself, is an express trust. Created normally by the voluntary act
of a private person, it will be subject to the traditional supervision
and fair opportunity" test, which would require examination of such issues as the

size of the claim asserted in the prior action, the appropriateness of the forum, the
competence and experience of counsel, any indications that the jury's verdict was
compromised, differences in the applicable law and the foreseeability of future
litigation.
A similar test, addressed to at least some of these elements, has been used in
other cases applying collateral estoppel offensively. Provident Tradesmens Bank
& Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 41x F.2d 88 (3d Cir. x969); Zdanok
v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. United Airlines,
216 F. Supp. 709, 725-29 (E.D. Wash. 1962); see Howell v. Vito's Trucking &
Excavating Co., 20 Mich. App. 140, 147, 173 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1969) (leaving the
issue to be decided by the trial judge guided by "broad principles of justice").
" Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. x968); Spettigue v. Mahoney,
8 Ariz. App. 281, 445 P.2d 557 (1968); McDougall v. School Dist., 212 Cal. App.
2d 422, 28 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1963) ; Albernaz v. City of Fall River, 346 Mass. 336,
191 N.E.2d 77, (1963); Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 213 A.2d 26 (1965).
The indeterminate result of Wisconsin decisions is described in Note, Mutuality of
Estoppel: McCourt v. Algiers in Context, x967 Wis. L. REv. 267.
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of an equity court, exercised in first instance by directions to
trustees, though also through power to adjudicate the rights and
duties of others joined as parties. Litigation that succeeds in
((preserving or increasing" trust assets will clearly justify a charge
for counsel fees on the whole trust estate." It is also assumed,
usually without discussion, that decedents' estates constitute
funds for this purpose - created by the owner's death and consisting of assets then owned and requiring administration.56 The
probate court will act through an appointee whose actions it must
ultimately approve and can at any time review or correct if its
intervention is needed.
Funds can also be created by the litigation itself, as with
creditors' bills which aim to take control of assets that the owner
was unwilling to surrender. Where the court action sought is
all-inclusive (e.g., a corporate receivership, sweeping all assets
into protective custody of a court appointee), it is easy to conceive of these assets as a fund, and to charge it with the fees of
lawyers who secured the receiver's appointment. 57 Creditors' bills
with more limited objectives - to reach particular assets or alter
priorities between different classes of creditors - may not require
appointment of a receiver or other court agent. Still, where such
proceedings have the effect of bringing assets of the debtor within
the reach of other creditors, the Greenough machinery can operate.5" "Control" would then consist of a power to adjudicate
conflicting claims as between all who are joined or who intervene
and to compel surrender of assets improperly withheld.
There can be subgroups of beneficiaries within a larger group
and minifunds within funds; it is not necessary that the interested
group of beneficiaries be lined up in an unbroken phalanx. In a
corporate receivership, for example, if a few unsecured creditors,
in a contest with secured creditors, obtain the release of particular
2 Walsh v. National Say. & Trust Co., 247 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Ewing
v. First Nat'l Bank, 2o9 Ga. 932, 76 S.E.2d 791 (1953); German Evangelical St.
Marcus Congregation v. Archambault, 404 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1966); In re Estate of
Trimble, 392 Pa. 277, 14o A.2d 609 (1958). See also pp. 1627-28 infra.
" Becht v. Miller, 279 Mich. 629, 273 N.W. 294 (1937); In re Schwint's Estate,
183 Okl. 439, 83 P.2d 161 (1938); In re Falling's Estate, 113 Ore. 6, 228 P. 821
(1924). See also pp. 1627-28 infra.
"7Buford v. Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 42 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1930);
Bishop & Collins v. Macon Lumber Co., 149 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. Ky. 1957); Bradshaw v. Bank of Little Rock, 76 Ark. 5o, 89 S.W. 316 (19o5); Davis v. Bay
State League, i58 Mass. 434, 33 N.E. 591 (1893).
58 Central Trust Co. v. Condon, 67 F. 84,
1o-11 (6th Cir. 2895) ; Muskegon
Boiler Works v. Tennessee Valley Iron & R.R., 274 F. 836 (M.D. Tenn. 192X);
White v. University Land Co., 49 Mo. App. 450, 466-7o (2892); Peterson v. John
J. Reilly, Inc., io5 N.H. 340, 2oo A.2d 21 (1964); In re Weed's Estate, 163 Pa.
595, 30 A. 272 (1894).
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assets from liens claimed by the latter and make these assets
available to pay all unsecured creditors pro rata, this outcome of
the contest will not in any way increase or preserve the corporate
assets, but will augment the recovery of one group by diminishing
that of the other. One can ignore the disadvantage to the losers,
the secured creditors, and charge the counsel fees of the active
litigants against the assets thus released. 9
Funds that have been impounded through direct court order
are an easy target for the Greenough machinery. An example is
Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker,60 where a federation of
consumer protection groups sued to enjoin an increase in gas
rates. Pending final decision the court authorized the gas company to collect higher rates but directed it to segregate the extra
sums collected in a special account. By the time the rate increase
was held to be invalid, excess payments totalling some 1,250,000
dollars had accumulated, to be refunded to approximately 175,000
consumers. Whether deposited by the gas company in a special
bank account or merely marked as credits on its books, these sums
were held by the gas company as custodian, subject to court order.
It was simple enough to order it to pay counsel fees to the successful lawyers and deduct that sum from the total restored to consumers.61
The fund on which the Greenough-Pettusmachinery can fasten
does not need to be created by explicit court order, as in the cases
just discussed, but can emerge as a byproduct, almost by accident. In State Mineral Board v. Abadie,62 a decree in 1941 had
established that some i2oo acres of oil-bearing land were owned
by the heirs of four persons as tenants in common. At the time
of the decree the number of heirs was about 84o but by the i96o's
the total had risen to some 40oo. Two of the heirs employed a
lawyer, Henriques, who persuaded the legislature to pass a statute
allowing any land owned by more than 5o co-owners to be leased
by the State Mineral Board with the consent of 5o co-owners.
Henriques took the lead in securing consent by the needed 5o and
in securing the Mineral Board's approval of oil lease forms he
drafted. The only litigation in which he engaged was a successful
defense of the statute he had promoted, when it was attacked on
59
See Nolte v. Hudson Navigation Co., 47 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. i93i). See also
Leeds & Lippincott Co. v. Nevius, 30 N.J. 281, 153 A.2d 45 (xgsg); Cintas v.
American Car & Foundry Co., 133 N.J. Eq. 301, 32 A.2d go (1943); cases cited
note 143 infra.
60 I95 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. ig5i).
"' Payment to the lawyers was made despite the fact that two lawyers who

were awarded fees had agreed with their own clients not to charge the clients for
their services. See p. x6o8 & note 34 supra.
62 164 So. 2d i5g (La. Ct. App. 1964).
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constitutional grounds. Finally the land was leased to two lessees
who paid the Board cash "bonuses" totalling 655,000 dollars.
Thus there emerged a fund which Henriques could charge for his
fee. The appellate court fixed the fee at II2,ooo dollars and made
it a first lien on the fund. The State Mineral Board could then
proceed at leisure to disentangle the genealogies of the thousands
of heirs to whom the balance would go.6"
In both Washington Gas Light and the oil-lease case, procedures had already been established that would ensure the ultimate
distribution of the funds to the multitudes of beneficiaries involved. But the mere discovery of a chargeable fund brings
temptation to a court that is inspired with sufficient zeal for the
"common fund" doctrine. Does it really matter that no beneficiaries have been discovered as yet or that possibly none will turn
up at all? Such inconvenient questions were brushed aside in
Gibbs v. Blackwelder,6 4 where two creditors holding a judgment
rendered in Florida sued on it in a federal court in Virginia. They
succeeded in unearthing an equitable interest of the judgment
debtor in land owned by his wife. This interest, of "very substantial value," 65 was more than sufficient to satisfy the judgment
sued on. No other creditors had been joined in the proceeding
and none had as yet attempted to reach the interest discovered,
though the plaintiffs said that others were "prepared" to do
so. 66 The plaintiffs - in this rare case, the clients - petitioned
for a charge on the debtors' interest for the counsel fee owed their
own counsel.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, speaking through
Judge Haynsworth, responded warmly: an equity court has full
power to award counsel fees to the "trail-blazer" so that "one
who led in hewing the path to victory is not left saddled with extensive attorney fees" that were not incurred "by his more timid
followers who held back until the fruits of the pioneer's success
were laid before them." 67 But one might ask, what if this
"3 In justifying the size of the fee awarded, the court stressed the time
and effort required in litigation (up to the United States Supreme Court) over
the constitutionality of the statute that made it possible to lease the tract as a unit.
Id. at x68. It seems likely that the years spent in lobbying with the legislature and
*the Mineral Board entered into the calculation.
Without the money fund that suddenly emerged it seems unlikely that either
the two active co-owners of the land or their lawyer could have recovered from
the other co-owners for the benefits conferred in making the tract productive, unless
one owner sued for partition (the solution desired least of all). Dawson, supra
note 7, at 1424.
64 346 F.2d 943 (4 th Cir. x965).
65 Id. at 944.
"3'Id.
at 946.
11 Id. at 945. Since the clients, not their lawyers, presented the claim for counsel
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"pioneer" blazed a trail that no one followed? Or what if his
followers were not so timid and blazed their own trail, collecting
from the debtor through some other means or suing in a different
court whose process could not reach the particular asset? The
Greenough doctrine would then become a pretext for charging the
loser, the original judgment debtor, with the winners' counsel fee.
Charging winners' fees to losers in adversary litigation may be a
good thing, but this is not the announced purpose of the Greenough
doctrine. One could put the point in a different way by saying that
the Greenough doctrine requires not only some identified assets on
which a court can impose a charge, but also beneficiaries, third
parties, that can be brought within that court's reach.
Enough has been said to indicate that a court's reach or "control," though vital, can take many forms. The control can be
remote or indirect, it can work through intermediaries who are
obedient to instructions or who in the last resort can be coerced.
Central, of course, is authority to adjudicate the rights and duties
of interested parties. The tests of control must be expansive because of the variety and complexity of the tasks involved. For
the declared object is to redistribute the costs of litigation in fair
proportion to the benefits to strangers that it produces. What is
important is the sufficiency of the means, not the form they take.
New Jersey has provided a case study of "court control." In
court rules issued in 1947 by the New Jersey Supreme Court,
under authority granted by a new state constitution, awards of
counsel fees were severely restricted,18 but in nonjury cases discretion was preserved to award counsel fees "out of a fund in
court." For a time this phrase was literally construed, at least
in the sense that depositing with a court clerk a sum of money
whose ownership was in dispute gave general authority to charge
it for counsel fees, even in purely adversary litigation. 9 In the
fees, it is probable that the plaintiffs' debt to their own lawyer was considered to
be a ceiling. The appellate court, in remanding, suggested to the trial court that
it consider deducting from plaintiffs' debt to the lawyers the fees charged other
creditors, so as to relieve the plaintiffs of their "disproportionate burden." Id.
at 946. This again presupposes, however, that other creditors would intervene
before the same court and in the same proceeding.
68
RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY § 3:54-7
(1948). These restrictions were aimed particularly at equity cases, where in the

words of Chief Justice Vanderbilt, principal author of the new rules, grants of
fees had become a "full scale scandal" because of the favoritism shown by some
trial judges toward their "fair haired boys." Lynch, The New Jersey Supreme
Court and the Counsel Fees Rule: Procedure or Substance and Remedy?, 4 SETON
HAIL L. REV. 19, 22, 423 (1972).
69
See Katz v. Farber, 4 N.J. 333, 72 A.2d 862 (ig5o) ; Baird v. Moore, 5o N.J.
Super. 156, 176, i41 A.2d 324, 334 (App. Div. 1958) ; Smith v. Smith, 78 N.J. Super.
28, 187 A.2d 367 (Ch. 1963). All three cases involved disputes over the division of
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reaction that finally came against this literal reading, "fund in
court" was described as meaning "the jurisdictional authority of
the court to deal with the subject matter." 70 Later New Jersey
decisions have held that it applies in corporate litigation where
the funds that "in legal contemplation were brought within the
control of the court" consisted merely of the undistributed profits
of a corporation 71 or the corporate assets as a whole, which had
been "increased" by money decrees against a corporate officer in
an accounting for misappropriated assets. 2 In this now greatly
expanded conception of "court control" New Jersey does not
differ significantly from other states, except perhaps in a legacy
of somewhat greater confusion.7 3
Possession of power that must be so loosely defined and that
can be exercised by such varied means sometimes brings temptation. If a fund can be found, though already created for other
purposes and connected only remotely with the subject of the
litigation, it seems so easy to use means at hand to tap it.74 When
proceeds from sale of jointly owned lands, the proceeds having been turned over
to the clerk of the court. "Funds in court" were found to exist in all three cases,
though in Katz it was held to be within trial court discretion to deny an award
to the loser.
One inventive litigant, disputing his liability to pay a sum of money, sued in
equity for an order directing him to pay it into court so that he could charge it
with his counsel's fee. Not surprisingly, this maneuver failed. Janovsky v.
American Motorists Ins. Co., ii N.J. z, 93 A.2d 1 (1952).
'o Sunset Beach Amusement Corp. v. Belk, 33 N.J. 162, x68, 162 A.2d 834, 837
(i96o) (interpleader by an escrow agent with deposit in court of the land contract
price when he was confronted with conflicting claims of vendor and vendee held
not a common fund). The case was similar on its facts to Katz v. Farber, 4 N.J.
333, 72 A.2d 862 (95o), see note 69 supra. For a discussion of the application of
the Greenough doctrine to adversary litigation, see pp. 1636-43 ilfra.
" Leeds & Lippincott Co. v. Nevius, 3o N.J. 281, 153 A.2d 45 (i959) (declaratory judgment proceeding brought by the corporation and joining certain selected
preferred and common stockholders as representatives of the others in each class
to determine whether the preferred stockholders were entitled to dividends).
72 Sarner v. Sarner, 38 N.J. 463, 185 A.2d 851 (1962) (minority stockholders'
derivative suit).
7New Jersey decisions are discussed in Note, Allowance of Counsel Fees
Out of a "Fund in Court": The New Jersey Experience, 17 RUTERs L. REv.

634 (1963), and at greater length, with severe criticism, in Lynch, supra note 68.
Since the state supreme court's rules on counsel fees depend upon its claim of an
exclusive power to regulate procedure, the issues are greatly complicated by
procedure-substance distinctions and by potential conflict between court and legislature. See id. at 489-97.
One aberration that apparently has not yet been overruled is Milberg v. Seaboard Trust Co., 7 N.J. 236, 81 A.2d 142 (1951), in which counsel fees were
awarded to losers, without even a showing that their effort produced any benefit.
"'See Regan v. Babcock, i96 Minn. 243, 264 N.W. 803 (0936), where six
taxpayers succeeded in securing cancellation of contracts for the construction of
highways, with a saving to the state that was found to be more than 390,000 dollars.
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this occurs or when the fund emerges by a sudden accident or is
deliberately manufactured by court order, it appears more and
more a manipulative device. Whether it is more than this is a
question that must be held in abeyance while its standard workings are more closely examined.
We should take note at this point of a restriction on the "common fund" doctrine, the restriction to equitable actions, that was
from the first artificial and is rapidly disappearing. New Jersey
retains this restriction by express provision of its court rules, but
it seems safe to say that everywhere else the Greenough doctrine
can apply to money judgments at law. The decisions, mostly quite
recent, that have made this extension involve very small numbers
of competing claimants, usually (including the lawyer) no more
than four, and the problems they raise relate chiefly to their
priorities.
This was true in Appeal of Harris,5 a condemnation proceeding brought by the City of Philadelphia against some mortgaged
land. The only contest at the trial was over the value of the
land and on this issue the owner's lawyer presented some expert witnesses. The final award to the owner was 67,000 dollars,
but the unpaid balance on the mortgage was 109,379 dollars. The
mortgagee, a bank, had notice of the condemnation proceeding and
of the owner's employment of a lawyer but was wholly inactive
until judgment had been entered. It then intervened to claim the
whole 67,ooo dollars, in partial satisfaction of the mortgage debt,
and the lawyer also intervened to assert that his lien for a fee was
prior. 6 As between the mortgagee-bank and the mortgagor-owner
it was perfectly clear that the bank was entitled to the whole
award. But the court held nevertheless that the lawyer had a
"charging lien" on the judgment which would have been a first
lien as against his own client and had the same priority against the
Counsel fees for the taxpayer plaintiffs were charged, first, against sums paid into
court by overpaid contractors and, second, against the state highway fund which
had been set up previously and was composed of revenues from the motor vehicle
tax. This fund, the court concluded, was saved from paying out more money
through the cancellation of the contracts. Counsel for the taxpayers did not need
a "charging" lien on this fund; it sufficed for the court to issue an order that the
fund pay them directly. To the objection that this was in effect a suit against the
state without its consent, the court answered that the Attorney General had
intervened in the taxpayers' suit, and joined in the prayer that the contracts be
cancelled; a charge on the state highway fund was therefore one of the "hazards"
of the litigation he joined. Id. at 249-53, 264 N.W. at 8o6-oS.
" 323 Pa. 124, x86 A. 92 (1936).
7The 67,000 dollar award had already been made before the two interventions.
The court in its discussion described the attorney's lien and the proceeding itself
as "equitable," but if so construed it seems that it was the interventions that
made it so.
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bank since the money judgment for his client was a fund that he
had augmehted.7" It might seem strange that an owner who comes
last can hire a lawyer who comes in first, but that the lawyer
comes first was one of the messages of Pettus.
The same result has been reached where the owner sued affirmatively and recovefed a money judgment against an -insurer for
losses to property that was subject to a prior lien. The lien creditor, intervening, could secure a share in the judgment only by
paying a fee to the owner's lawyer; if the insurance proceeds were
not enough to pay lien creditor and lawyer both, the lawyer came
first.7 8 Again, there is nothing startlingly new in this, but one is
reminded of the anomaly involved on encountering an insurance
adjuster who was not a lawyer and whose claim against a fund
that he produced by a settlement was given short shrift indeed.7"
Three-party contests have arisen more often recently in cases
where an insured tort claimant employs a lawyer who secures a
judgment or out-of-court settlement and the insurer, until then
passive, intervenes to claim a partial share through subrogation."
The insurer's share may be partial either because the interest
invaded was not fully insured or because the tortfeasor simultaneously harmed an interest that was insured (e.g., property)
and one that was not (e.g., by causing personal injuries). If the
insurer were to sue, either jointly with the insured or separately,
its interest in the case would be disclosed to all concerned, and,
worst of all, to a jury if the case reached trial. The insurer has
another recourse, to notify the tortfeasor and the latter's insurer,
if he has one, of the insurer's interest as subrogee, so that any
subsequent payments made to the insured will be ineffective to
discharge the insurer's claim. 8' After such notice has been given
the spirit of mutual aid between insurance companies will prob77

78

323 Pa. at 135, 186 A. at 97.
See Lomack Home for the Aged v. Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Ass'n., 155 Iowa

728, 133 N.W. 725 (i9x) (proceeds recovered by suit on a windstorm insurance
policy were enough to pay the plaintiff owner's lawyer and the first mortgagee but
not the second mortgagee); Little Rock Road Mach. Co. v. Light, 240 Ark. 1012,
403 S.W.2d 726 (1966) (extra fee of the owner's lawyer was deducted from the
judgment rendered in favor of the lien creditor).
7
See Callahan v. Railroad Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 36 N.Y.S.2d 550 (App.
T. 1942) (per curiam) (owner employed an insurance adjuster who procured money
payable to mortgagee, but the latter's benefit was not enough to warrant liability
since he had not contracted for the service).
"°Subrogation may be "legal" and be routinely given, as in property and

liability insurance, or it may be the result of express contract through standardized
clauses that have come into common use. R. KEEToN, IsuRA CE LAW § 3.io(a)
(197) (describing the recognition given recently to express provisions for subrogation in types of insurance -accident,
medical, and hospitalization -where
it
would not otherwise be awarded).
"' Id. § 3.Io(c) (2).
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ably give a sufficient guarantee without the expense of joining a
lawsuit. It is quite intelligible that insurers in such cases are
tempted to "sit by," leave the initiative to the party injured (the
insured), yet expect to share in the proceeds.
A 1961 Nebraska case, United Services Automobile Association v. Hills,8 2 was not the first but is probably the most influential
3
decision extending the "common fund" doctrine to this situation.
The insured incurred both personal injury and property damage
in a collision with one Miller. He was insured, however, only
against property damage by United Services, which paid him
454.93 dollars for the injury to his car. The insurance policy contained an express provision for subrogation of United Services to
any claim the insured had against third persons. The insured hired
an attorney who brought an action against Miller for personal
injuries, deleting from his complaint the subrogation claim of
United Services at its express request. United Services, however,
notified Miller's insurer of its subrogation claim, and the two
insurers then reached a settlement which allotted 454.93 dollars
for property damage. Miller's insurer, confronted with a demand
from the insured's lawyer for a fee to be deducted from this sum,
brought a declaratory judgment action, paid the 454.93 dollars
into court, and disappeared from the case. A majority of the
Nebraska court held that the insured's lawyer had recovered or
preserved a fund, and that the refusal of United Services to employ
him to enforce its subrogation claim gave it no immunity after it
decided to accept the "avails" of the litigation; the court ordered
payment of a proportionate share of the expenses, including attorney's fees, out of the sum received. 4
82

172 Neb.

128, 1O9

N W.2d

174

(ig6i).

83 Similar decisions had been reached earlier in Stancil v. United States, 200

F. Supp. 36, 43-47 (E.D. Va. ig6i) ; Brown v. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., 2o5 F.
Supp. 479 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
An earlier case to the contrary is Lewis v Railroad Retirement Bd., 256 Ala.
430, 54 So. 2d 777 (ig5i), which used arguments that would probably be rejected
now: the injured person had not sued in a class action and the "fund" doctrine
applies only in equity, not at law. But the court was also influenced by the provisions of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. § 351 (197o),
which gave the subrogee, the Railroad Retirement Board, a prior lien on the
proceeds of the judgment.
The problems about to be discussed, involving tort claims as funds, constantly
recur also in cases involving third party liability in industrial accidents. Deductions
of lawyers' fees from subrogees' claims are regulated, usually in detail, by compensation statutes which give varying weight to competing interests -incentives
to employers or insurers to make prompt payments as against a desire to protect
the statutory scales of compensation to employees. The one consistent feature is
that lawyers' fees come first. 2 A. LARSON, TnE LAw OF WoP.xmEN'S COIPENSATION § 74.32 (1970).
84 172 Neb. at 133, io9 N.W.2d at 177. The one-third contingent fee that his
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United Services set off a considerable wave of similar decisions. They present some novel aspects of "court control" since
in these intimate tripartite situations involving subrogation, rights
and duties are so closely interlocked. No problems arise where
the lawsuit brought by the insured has proceeded to judgment
and the contenders for its proceeds are duly joined, either as
original parties or by intervention; the court rendering the judgment will clearly have power to allocate the sums not yet paid by
the judgment debtor to the claimants found to be entitled."6 The
same will be true if the tort claim is settled before judgment, as
it normally will be, and the sum agreed upon is voluntarily paid
into court8 7 or has not yet been paid by the judgment defendant.88
But the principal debtor, after settlement is reached, will seldom
have any stake in disputes over the lawyers' fees of his opponents.
It will often be prudent for the debtor to create another minifund
himself, in the form of a check payable jointly to the rival claimclient had agreed to was carried over to the property damage "fund," 172 Neb. at
134-35, IO9 N.W.2d at x78, as has occurred in a few other tort-subrogation cases
of this type. The methods of calculating fees payable by nonclients are discussed
in note 35 supra.
As to the law-equity distinction, the court described the declaratory judgment
proceeding as essentially interpleader and therefore "equitable," 172 Neb. at 232,
IO9 N.W.2d at 177, but clearly the original damage action had been brought on
the law docket.
"5 E.g., Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Combs, 249 Ark. 533, 46o S.W.2d 77o
(1970); Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hammett, 237 Ark. 954, 377 S.W.2d
8x (1964); Phillips v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 253 A.2d 502 (Del. 1969); Forsyth
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 162 So. 2d 926 (Fla. App. 1964); Klacik v.
Kovacs, iii N.J. Super. 307, 268 A.2d 305 (App. Div. 197o); Tennessee Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pritchett, 54 Tenn. App. 410, 391 S.W.2d 67, (1964) ; State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Elkins, 451 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 2970); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Geline, 48 Wis. 2d 290, 179 N.W.2d 8i5 (1970). In
Klacik, Pritchett, and Elkins, the contingent fee arrangements between the lawyer
and his client were carried over and applied to the "fund."
It is worth noting that Klacik is a New Jersey decision that follows the United
Services case despite the express restriction of the New Jersey "fund in court"
rule to nonjury cases.
The only state that has held out against the recent tide is Montana. E.g.,
Wyoming Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mondale, 502 P.2d 39 (Mont. 1972);
Sisters of Charity v. Nichols, 157 Mont. io6, 483 P.2d 279 (,972).
8
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Elkins, 451 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. i97o) (interpleader by the judgment debtor). In McDonald v. E.J.
Lavino Co., 43o F.2d io65, 1072-73 & n.7 ( 5 th Cir. 2970), the subrogee-insurer
intervened. In Phillips v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 253 A.2d 502 (Del. 1969), the
subrogee secured an injunction against execution of the judgment in favor of
the insured.
" See, e.g., United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Hills, 172 Neb. 128, xo9 N.W.2d 174
(x961). See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Geline, 48 Wis. 2d 290, 179
N.W.2d 815 (297o).
" Klacik v. Kovacs, ii N.J. Super. 307, 268 A.2d 305 (App. Div. 1970).
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ants (subrogee-insurer against the insured or his lawyer), and
cast on them the burden of seeking a court decision if they cannot
agree. 9 If the debtor does accede to the claim of the insured or
his lawyer and pays the extra fee demanded, the propriety of this
payment can be tested by the subrogee - either by suing the
principal debtor who, after riotice of the subrogee's rights, will
not be discharged by an unauthorized payment, or by suing the
insured or his lawyer, who also owe the subrogee-insurer a duty
not to impair its rights. 0
With so much of the management of their relations turned
over to direct contests between the interested parties, the question
was sure to arise whether a fund is needed -why not a direct
action against the subrogee-insurer with personal liability for the
value of the lawyer's services? This could be, again, an action
by the client (the insured) for contribution to his own litigation
costs or an action by his lawyer for an extra fee; for in the situations now being considered there are several cases in which clients
have succeeded in their own claims for contribution, charged to
funds consisting of money judgments or the money proceeds of
s~ttlement. 91 It could be argued that the important step was taken
when money judgments at law were fully accepted as "funds."
The overwhelming majority of tort claims are settled and never
reach judgment. In these cases, should the recovery of fees depend on whether the settlement provides that the principal debtor
pay the agreed sum to a court clerk or a joint check is written?
In all such actions so far brought seeking to make the subrogee
personally liable, the lawyers and not the clients sued and the
familiar objections prevailed: the insured's lawyer merely performed his contract with his own client, the insurer was a stranger
to that contract, and the service rendered to it was "incidental"
and also unsolicited.9 2
" See, e.g., Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hammett, 237 Ark. 954, 377
S.W.2d 8i (1964); Forsyth v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., i62 So. 2d 96
(Fla. App. 1964); Rankin v. Superior Auto. Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 38o, Zi7 S.E.2d

(ig6o).
As a minimum the insured or his lawyer are accountable for sums they
receive that should have been paid to the subrogee. R. KEFToN, INsuRANEE LAW
525

§

9

3.10(c)(2)

(i97I). If the subrogee sues the insured or his lawyer for siphoning

off money due the subrogee, it will be a defense that the sum retained was merely
the fee that was owed by the subrogee to the insured's lawyer. National Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d X52 (1967); Tennessee Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pritchett, 54 Tenn. App. 410, 39X S.W.2d 67, (1964) ; see General
Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Driscoll, 315 Mass. 360,

52

N.E.2d 970 (1944).

91 Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hammett, 237 Ark. 954, 377 S.W.2d
8" (1964); Phillips v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 253 A.2d 502 (Del. 1969); Klacik
v. Kovacs, iii N.J. Super. 307, 268 A.2d 305 (App. Div. i97o).
92 Richter v. United States, 19o F. Supp. x59 (E.D. Pa. ig6o), ag'd, 269 F.2d
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But Nebraska, which led the way with United Services in
ig6i, took two longer steps in 1969, holding (I) the insurersubrogee was personally liable for the value of the services of the
insured's lawyer in securing a settlement, and (2) it was unimportant that the settlement was secured without any litigation
whatever.9 3 Unless this were allowed, the court said, it would be
possible to defeat the lawyer's recovery through a direct payment
by the principal debtor to the insurer-subrogee, an event that had
occurred in the particular case. 4 Furthermore, it seemed to the
court mere formalism to deny plaintiff an attorney's fee merely
because of the "fortuity" that no lawsuit had been started. In
this last respect, even more than in obliterating any requirement
of a "fund," the Nebraska court stepped off into outer darkness. 95
IV.

MEANS OF BENEFITING FUNDS

The announced purpose of the "common fund" device for
509 (3d Cir. g6i), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 828 (1962); First of 'Georgia Ins. Co.
v. Home, 12o Ga. App. 379,
S.E.2d 452 (1969); Commercial Union Ins. Co.
S7
v. Scott, x16 Ga. App. 633, i58 S.E.2d 295 (1967); Rankin v. Superior Auto.
Ins. Co., 277 S.C. 380, ii7 S.E.2d 525 (i96o). The Richter case became tangled
up with the question whether a claim in quasi-contract, assumed to be valid under
Pennsylvania law, came within the tests for "contract" for suits against the United
States under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (197o).
"' Krause v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 Neb. 588, 169 N.W.2d 6oi
(1969). The court struggled manfully to find a "fund" by arguing that subrogation
is "equitable" and that the insured held the proceeds of the settlement "in trust"
for the subrogee to the extent-that they covered damage to property, which it had
insured. But no particular aiset or sum of money was identified as the subject of
the trust and the remedy given was a simple money judgment.
14 It appears that the Nebraska court has since receded on this issue somewhat.
In Moyer & Moyer v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., igo Neb. 174, 2o6 N.W.2d 644
(I973), direct payment in full by the principal debtor to the subrogated insurer
was held to preclude any recovery by the insured's lawyer against the. insurer, since
there was no benefit to the insurer from the lawyer's services.
" I have found two other cases where lawyers for damage claimants recovered
fees from insurers where settlements were secured without suit. Both cases involved .workmen's compensation payments and both decisions laid stress on statutes
that drew no distinction between settlements made with or without suit. McCally
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 247 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1965); Furia v.
Philadelphia, i8o Pa. Super. 5o, ii8 A.2d 236 0955).
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 278 Minn. 45, 153 N.W.2d 152 (1967),
allowed a deduction for services in securing a settlement that seemingly was agreed
to without suit.
The decision by the Nebraska court in Krause v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 184 Neb: 588, 169 N.W.2d 6oi (i969), see note 93 supra, is more surprising in
view of the earlier case of Blacker v. Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co., 133 Neb. 66, 273
N.W. 836 (x197),'where litigation had been commenced but the supreme court held
it improper to award counsel .fees in advance of final decision of the case, since
the application of the Greenough "common fund" doctrine required that the litigation be brought to a final and successful conclusion.
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awarding fees is to reach and prevent a peculiar form of unjust
enrichment, so a benefit to the fund is supposedly required. But
the tests of benefit differ markedly from those used elsewhere in
the law of restitution. The standard formula suggests this in
mixing together three distinct ideas: that a fund can be benefited
by being "created, increased or protected" (or "preserved"). The
processes described by these terms are not mutually exclusive. At
least two, perhaps all three, can occur at the same time. But each
of the terms has highly variable meanings and they lead in somewhat different directions. A composite picture of all the shades
in their meanings would be useless. Instead these tests will be
examined in two standard situations where they have been much
used: funds administered by fiduciaries (express trusts and decedents' estates) and funds administered for the benefit of
creditors.
It should be said at the outset that the "common fund" doctrine derived from Greenough presupposes that litigation has
not only been commenced but has also succeeded."' Prosecution
through to final decree is not needed; a settlement out of court
will suffice if its terms can be ascribed to the pressure of a lawsuitY There is good reason to require success in some form, for
it would be difficult to justify any measures compelling such
outsiders to contribute to a litigant's expense merely because they
would have gained if he had won. Furthermore, if the failure of
the litigation is clearly beneficial this will almost certainly be
because the losing litigant was in some sense an adversary. It
would be a strange inversion if the Greenough doctrine enabled
" Thomas v. Peyser, 118 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1941); In re Marcuse & Co.,
4 F.2d 814 (N.D. Ill. 1924), aff'd, i F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1926); Dent v. Foy, 2X4
Ala. 243, 107 So. 210 (1925); Coker v. Coker, 208 Ala. 239, 94 So. 308 (1922);
In re Equitable Trust Co., 27 Del. Ch. 6o, 3o A.2d 271 (Ch. 1943); Blacker v.
Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co., 133 Neb. 66, 273 N.W. 836 (1937) ; In re Dreier's Estate,
83 N.J. Eq. 618, 92 A. 51 (1914); In re Vorndran's Estate, X32 Misc. 61x, 230
N.Y.S. 326 (Sur. Ct. 1928); Fields v. Fields, 139 Ore. 41, 3 P.2d 77, (931).
" Powell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 2959); Dent v. Foy,
214 Ala. 243, 107 So. 210 (1925); In re Schwint's Estate, 183 Okla. 439, 83 P.2d
161 (x938); Carmack v. Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co., i8o Tenn. 571, 177 S.W.2d
35I (X944). In re Schwint's Estate involved a lawyer employed by an administrator and two lawyers employed by four of nine heirs, who cooperated actively.
The court ordered a fee splitting-four-sevenths to the former and three-sevenths
to the latter.
Settlements of tort claims to which insurers seek subrogation have frequently
been held to make the Greenough-Pettusmachinery available. See, e.g., Washington
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hammett, 237 Ark. 954, 377 S.W.2d 811 (2964); Klacik
v. Kovacs, iii N.J. Super. 307, 268 A.2d 305 (App. Div. 197o); Tennessee Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pritchett, 54 Tenn. App. 410, 391 S.W.2d 67, (2964); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Geline, 48 Wis. 2d 290, 179 N.W.2d 814 (i97o).
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losers in adversary contests to charge their counsel fees to winners. The effects on "common funds" of conflicts among claimants
will be further discussed in the next section, but for the moment
we can assume that the doctrine does not apply to benefits conferred by the defeat of an adversary. There are situations, some
of which will be discussed presently, where losers are allowed, for
somewhat different reasons, to charge counsel fees to funds. But
the starting point in the discussion that follows will be that the
litigation brought has succeeded and the question will be whether
it has conferred a benefit on a fund.
A. Express Trusts and Decedents' Estates
The most obvious way to confer a benefit on an estate administered by a fiduciary is to prevent its wrongful depletion by the
fiduciary himself. This will include, of course, successful litigation by a beneficiary that compels restoration of misappropriated
assets. 5 A decree establishing that the fiduciary is personally
liable for failure to retrieve assets belonging to the estate "increases" or at least "protects" it.99 Preventing unauthorized
charges by the fiduciary for his own services may also justify
a charge for counsel fees, at least where the net saving to the
estate justifies the burden cast upon it.'0 0 Still more clearly, where
the fiduciary sets up an opposing claim of his own to assets included in the estate, defeat of such a claim in litigation by one or
more beneficiaries will justify a charge against the whole estate
if the sum total to be distributed to all beneficiaries is thereby
increased.''
It is not only through contests with defaulting or self-serving
88 Kinney

v. Uglow, 163 Ore. 539, 98 P.2d

ioo6

(1940).

This was the situation

in the Greenough case itself. See pp. 1601-02 supra.
"i n re Simons' Will, 55 Conn. 239, ii A. 36 (1887); Farmers' Bank & Trust
Co. v. Stanley, io Ky. 762, 228 S.W. 691 (1921); In re Linch's Estate, 139 Neb.
761, 298 N.W. 697 (ig4i).
100 See In re Estate of Lundell, io7 Cal. App. 2d 463, 237 P.2d 62 (195X) (allowing such charges); In re Graves' Will, 197 Misc. 638, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 320 (Sur. Ct.
,950) (same) ; In re Estate of Heilbronner, 39 Misc. 2d 912, 242 N.Y.S.2d i18 (Sur.
Ct. 1963) (suggesting that if the benefit is in money it should exceed the cost).
Where a compulsory accounting discloses no assets unaccounted for, one can conclude either that there was no benefit or that the litigation failed; in either case,
there is no allowance. In re Vorndran's Estate, 132 Misc. 6II, 230 N.Y.S. 326
(Sur. Ct. 1928).
1 Kimbrough v. Dickinson, 251 Ala. 677, 39 So. 2d 241 (1949); Dent v. Foy,
214 Ala. 243, 107 So. 210 (1925) ; In re Estate of Reade, 31 Cal. 2d 669, 191 P.2d
745 (1948); Becht v. Miller, 279 Mich. 629, 273 N.W. 294 (i937); Trautz v. Lemp,

334 MO. 1085, 72 S.W.2d IO4 (I934) ; Bean v. Bean, 74 N.H. 404, 68 A. 409 (1907) ;
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Berenblum, 9i N.J. Super. 551, 221 A.2d 758 (App.
Div. 1966).
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fiduciaries that individual beneficiaries can increase or protect
the estate for the advantage of all. Recovering from third parties
assets belonging to the estate and bringing them into the general
distribution will suffice, without any showing of fault in trustee
or executor. 0 2 Defeating the claim of a third person to a distributive share may also suffice if it leaves more for those who
remain,"'3 though there is a question how far the costs of such
strife between rival claimants should burden the common estate."' 4
It was suggested earlier that there can be funds within funds
and this implies that there can be benefits that are concentrated
on the minifunds. Where this occurs it turns out all too often that
the main contest is between rival claimants, since an increase in
one will probably be at the expense of the rest. But one can
disregard the loss to the rest and disregard also the absence of
any effect on the fund as a whole and focus attention on the subgroup that gains.
An illustration of a transfer strictly between subgroups, without any effect on the fund as a whole, is Petition of Crum.0 1
Here a testator had made devises in identical words to three
persons and their heirs and assigns. When the will took effect all
three persons had already died, so the executors sued for construction of the will, to determine whether the deaths caused the
legacies to lapse. The heirs of two deceased devisees, though
served with process, did not appear or respond in any way.. The
heirs of the third. employed lawyer Crum, who appeared, actively
contended, and in the end established that the devises had not
lapsed. The action was not formally brought as a class action.
in a state that now accepts collateral estoppel in its offensive
form the decision as to one devisee would be conclusive as to the
other two, since the crucial language was the same in all three.
In any event, the court that decided against lapse of one would
have before it, in the same proceeding, the same issue concerning
the other two. It surely would be under the strongest compulsion
to treat all three alike and hold all the devises effective. This
would of course mean depriving persons who would have taken
"'In re Estate of Hirsch, 154 Misc. 736, 278 N.Y.S. 255 (Sur. Ct. 1935); In re
226 App. Div. 291, 234 N.Y.S, 68o (Sur. Ct. 1929); it rc
Schwint's Estate, 383 Okla. 439, 83 P.2d 161 (1938); Kauffman v. Hunt, 65 Pa. D.
& C. 566 (C.P. 1948). In re Estate of Rosenberg, 241 App. Div. 6oi, 268 N.Y.S. 733,
aff'd, 265 N.Y. 521, 193 N.E. 302 (934), refused an allowance because, though
there was a.benefit, it was not large enough.
'°3In re Estate of Engebretson, 68 S.D. 255, 1 N.W.2d 35X (0941).
104 Girty v. Girty's Adm'r, i8o Ky. 786, 203 S.W. 730 (1918) (a contest between two creditors of a decedent's estate in which a charge on the estate for the
winner's counsel fee was denied).
2o5 i96 S.C. 528, 14 S.E.2d 2X (1941).

Estate of Lounsberry,
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the assets in question by gifts over or intestacy. A charge against
the estate as a whole would therefore be wrong, since it would
cast some of the burden on those who lost. The court was clear
that lawyer Crum should be able to charge the passive heirs who
gained by his work and would otherwise "reap where they have
not sown. .. ." 106 Their shares were therefore charged with the
extra fee that the court awarded lawyer Crum. 10 7 As to the passive
heirs the lands they took by the valid devises were funds created,
though the estate as a whole had neither gained nor lost.
The.benefits described so far have all been defined by economic tests of value added or loss prevented. But funds administered by fiduciaries can be benefited in other ways that involve
no economic consequences whatever. In- this context the "common fund" doctrine has borrowed some of the thinking summarized in the shorthand phrase that a trust or decedent's estate
should bear. the cost of "its own" administration. This notion is
close enough to the "common fund" doctrine that it was used as
a supportive argument in the Greenough case itself. But its primary meaning is not that the costs of lawsuits should be distributed in proportion to the gains they produce but rather that
a fiduciary who does his duty should not be charged for administrative costs of any kind. So where there is need for "construction," i.e., where there is doubt as to the meaning or validity of
some provision in a will or trust, the executor or trustee can apply
for instructions and any, resulting litigation costs will be chargeable to the estate. 08
Most states go further and permit an interested beneficiary
who engages, affirmatively or defensively, in litigating such issues
to charge his lawyer's fee to the whole estate. No great remorse
seems to be felt about diminishing the donor's bounty in this way;
in judicial opinions in these cases there is at least a hint that it
serves the testator or settlor right for using ambiguous or otherwise doubtful language. But an expanded conception of benefit is
also at work. Resolving such doubts will aid administration by
the executor or trustee. Effective representation of opposing interests will likewise aid the court in deciding doubtful issues.
The Supreme Court of Kansas epitomized the thinking that is
frequently found: "it is a benefit to the estate as an entity to have
a question of law determined where there is doubt as to the proper
construction to be placed upon a will." "I9
As to contestants who prevail, a charge on the "entity" for
1 6

o Id. at 533, 14 S.E.2d at 24.
Id. at 534, 14 S.E.2d at 24.
1083 A. ScoTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 188.4 (3d ed. I967).
10' In re Estate of Sowder, 185 Kan. 74, 87, 340 P.2d 907, 918 (1959).
107
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their lawyers' fees should not be surprising, 110 but where the
contest relates to "construction" of a will even losers are usually
compensated in the same way, provided their claims were "honest"
and there was some basis for doubt."' While most of these cases
have involved provisions in wills, the same reasoning has been
applied to trusts created inter vivos and there seems to be no
reason for a distinction. Where uncertainties as to the meaning
or validity of trust provisions may hamper administration, even
contestants who fail in asserting their own claims can render a
benefit to the whole trust estate through participating
actively in
2
litigation that helps to resolve uncertainty."1
"°In re Estate of Curtis, io3 Colo. 361, 86 P.2d 260 (1938); McCormick v.
Hall, 337 Ill. 232, 168 N.E. goo (1929). Where the issues as to interpretation and
-validity are complex and interlocking, all assisting parties will be repaid by the
estate for their lawyers' fees. De Konvin v. First Nat'l Bank, 84 F. Supp. 918, 938
(N.D. Ill.), modified, 179 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1949) ; In re Estate of Reeve, 393 Il.
272, 65 N.E.2d 815 (1946).
It seems unlikely, however, that other courts would follow Merkel v. Long, 372
Mich. I44, 125 N.W.2d 284 (1963), where an evenly divided court affirmed an
award of counsel fees, payable out of the entire estate, for lawyers who drafted a
settlement fixing shares as between life and remainder beneficiaries in three testamentary trusts.
"I Orme v. Northern Trust Co., 25 Ill.
2d i51, 183 N.E.2d 505, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 935 (i962); Eckford v. Eckford, 53 N.W. 345 (Iowa 1892); Central
Trust Co. v. Harris, X52 Kan. 296, 103 P.2d 902 (1940); In re Estate of Sowder,
z85 Kan. 74, 340 P.2d 907 (i959); Kingston v. St. Louis Trust Co., 348 Mo. 448,
154 S.W.2d 39 (194); Young v. Exum, rio R.I. 685, 296 A.2d 451 (1972); Evans
v. Adams, 180 S.C. 214, 185 S.E. 57 (1936); Vanderbilt Univ. v. Mitchell, 162
Tenn. 217, 36 S.W.2d 83 (i93i); In re Estate of Johnson, 46 Wash. 2d 308, 280
P.2d 1034 (i955). A case that denies any allowance because the will was unambiguous and needed no construction is Bartlett v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
358 Ill. 452, 193 N.E. 501 (1934).
Clarksdale Hosp. v. Wallis, 187 Miss. 834, 193 So. 627 (1940), refused, however, to charge against the whole estate of the decedent the counsel fees of one
legatee which had merely established the validity of its own legacy, saying that to
force unsuccessful adversaries to pay fees incurred in accomplishing their defeat
would be "punitive damages." Id. at 843, 193 So. at 628. Failure to augment
the estate was given in Gregg v. Gardner, 73 N.M. 347, 388 P.2d 68 (1963), and
Fields v. Fields, 139 Ore. 41, 3 P.2d 771 (193x), as the reason for denying losers any
allowance. In In re Larson's Will, 211 Wis. 237, 247 N.W. 88o (933), the denial
rested on a strict reading of the Wisconsin statute. A very guarded but not wholly
negative approach was adopted in Clayton v. Stein, 135 Md. 684, lo9 A. 444 (1920).
1221In re Atwood's Trust, 227 Minn. 495, 35 N.W.2d 736 (0949); Annot., 9
A.L.R.2d 1132 (1949). In the Atwood case an action for a declaratory judgment
was brought by one claimant and an adverse but losing claimant, joined as defendant, was allowed his lawyer's fees from the trust estate. The court rejected
any distinction between beneficiaries who sued affirmatively and those brought in
as defendants and in the cases cited in notes iio, izi supra, no distinction of this
kind is drawn.
The requirement in Hereford v. Unknown Heirs, 306 S.W.2d 648 (Mo. App.
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The "common fund" doctrine and the rule permitting estates
to be charged for their own "construction" overlap somewhat.
They both entail a conception of funds as separate entities, almost
endowed with a life of their own, that are required to pay their
own way. So in purporting to apply the "common fund" doctrine
a benefit can be found where there was no object whatever to
"create" or "increase" the fund but at most to "protect" it in a
very extended sense - to ensure that a valid intent of its creator
was ascertained and carried out. Numerous cases, for example,
have found benefit to decedents' estates through successful contests by distributees of invalid wills proposed for probate, since
an unlawful distribution of the estate is thereby prevented." 3 A

benefit can be conferred on a trust through "defending" it against
efforts by a trustee or another beneficiary to terminate it pre-

maturely,"

4

through opposing proposals of trustees to dispose of

trust assets in a manner that would have been profitable but was
not authorized by the settlor,"15 or through securing the appoint-6
ment of the full quota of trustees that the settlor had desired."
1957), that an ambiguous will must also include a trust for an allowance to be
made can hardly be taken seriously and was expressly rejected in McCormick v.
Hall, 337 Ill. 232, 168 N.E. goo (1929).
1' Louisville Presbyterian Theolog. Sem. v. Botto, 117 Ky. 962, 8o S.W. I77
(1904) ; In re Estate of Merica, 99 Neb. 229, 155 N.W. 887 (1915) ; In re Estate
of Limberg, 255 App. Div. 855, ii N.Y.S.2d 908 (1939); In re Faling's Estate,
X13 Ore. 6, 228 P. 821 (1924); Smith v. Haire, 138 Tenn. 255, 197 S.W. 678
(1917); In re Estate of Statler, 58 Wash. 199, ioS P. 433 (igio). But In re
Estate of Baxter, 94 Mont. 257, 22 P.2d 182 (I933), held that the successful defense of a contested will would not justify an allowance, and Proudfit v. Coons,
137 Colo. 353, 325 P.2d 273 (1958), likewise refused an allowance where heirs
contested two wills and succeeded in invalidating only ond of them. Success in a
Florida probate court in opposing the probate of one will and securing the probate
of another was held in Estate of Brannan, 66 Misc. 2d 283, 321 N.Y.S.2d 49 (Sur.
Ct. I971), not to justify an allowance out of the estate of a New York decedent,
though the estate was to be distributed under a power of appointment exercised
by the Florida will: "[Als a matter of public policy, we should be very cautious
about increasing the types of cases" in which lawyers, already paid by their own
clients, seek extra pay from strangers. Id. at 288, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
114 Walsh v. National Say. & Trust Co., 247 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. i957) ; German
Evangelical St. Marcus Congregation v. Archambault, 404 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. i966).
...Ewing v. First Natl Bank, 209 Ga. 932, 76 S.E.2d 791 (I953); Jesser v.
Mayfair Hotel, Inc., 360 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. x962).
116In re Estate of Trimble, 392 Pa. 277, i4o A.2d 6og (1958) (five trustees had
been provided for and a single trustee had claimed the power to act) ; Monroe v.
Winn, i9 Wash. 2d 462, 465, 142 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1943) (ordering payment out
of trust assets for an unsuccesslul suit to remove trustees, on the grounds that (i)
their confirmation in office accomplished the settlor's purpose and (2) "administrative questions conductive [sic] to proper future administration of the trust
estate were settled").
But see In re Estate of Love, 136 Neb. 458, 286 N.W. 381 (1939) (refusing to
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Invalidating even a single clause in a will has been held to benefit
a decedent's estate "by preventing the unlawful distribution and
a miscarriage of justice .... ,,117 The concept of benefit is thus
loaded with a policy judgment that private litigation should be
enlisted both to aid in enforcing the purposes of private donors
and in policing the conduct of their fiduciaries.
B. Proceedings in Aid of Creditors
The "creation" of funds for the purpose of satisfying creditors, through various forms of receivership or creditors' bills, will
ordinarily occur through the initiative of one of the creditors.
Where the debtor's financial condition is found to justify such
proceedings, setting the process in motion is conceived to be a
benefit sufficient for an award of counsel fees, almost as though
a reward in this form were deserved for bringing the assets "into
court." 118 Then even if a receiver or other liquidator'is appointed,
private litigation can give reinforcement in some useful ways that
the "common fund" doctrine can encourage. Here as elsewhere
clients (individual creditors) can sue for contribution to their
costs in counsel fees and occasionally do,1"' though the incentive
supplied almost always takes the form of an extra fee for their
lawyers.
The most obvious form of "increase" of a fund assembled for
these purposes is recapturing an asset of the debtor and making
it available to satisfy claims of all the creditors.120 The fact that
find any benefit because a decedent's estate had no "pecuniary interest" in whether
a particular person was to serve as executor in the event that a challenged codicil
were held valid); Hempstead v. Meadville Theolog. School, 286 Pa. 493, 134 A.
103 (1926) (an injunction had been secured by dissenting trustees against transferring to another state the assets of a school, but it did not appear that the
assets themselves were threatened with dissipation).
"'In re Demmel, 129 Colo. 107, X12, 267 P.2d 647, 649 (1994). Contra,
McCormick v. Rand, 246 Ore. 6o6, 425 P.2d 488 (x967).
"'8Buford v. Tobacco Growers' Co-op Ass'n, 42 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1930);
Central Trust Co. v. Condon, 67 F. 84, 1io-i (6th Cir. 1895); Strang v. Taylor, 82
Ala. 213, 2 So. 760 (1887); Winslow v. Harold G. Ferguson Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 274,
X53 P.2d 724 (1944); White v. University Land Co., 49 Mo. App. 450 (1892); In
re Cooperative Wage Fund, 65 Pa. D. & C. 274 (C.P. 1948); Tennessee United
Paint Store, Inc. v. D.H. Overmyer Warehouse Co., 62 Tenn. App. 722, 467 S.W.2d
8o6, cert. denied, 467 S.W.2d 806 (Tenn. I972).
The Federal Bankruptcy Act provides similarly for an allowance for lawyers'
fees for creditors in involuntary proceedings who succeed in securing an adjudication of bankruptcy and the appointment of a trustee. ii U.S.C. § xo4(a) (i97o).
119 Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Peterson, 5 Cal. 2d 6oi, 55 P.2d 867
(2936); Swedish-American Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 7x Minn. 5o8, 74 N.W. 286
(i898); White v. University Land Co., 49 Mo. App. 450 (I892).
121 City of Wewoka v. Banker, 117 F.2d 839 (ioth Cir. 194); In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 318 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.N.Y. I97O); Anniston Loan &
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the interests of the creditors are represented by a receiver will
present no obstacle, for the success of the individual creditor
merely shows that the receiver's representation was inadequate. 2 '
Defeating another creditor's claim that a receiver had approved
the assets from depletion and at least
through collusion saves
"preserves" the fund.'2 2 But it does not seem that standard doctrine goes much beyond this in encouraging efforts to bring
maximum returns. 23
Where the principal object in administering funds is not to
carry out the directives of their donor-creators (as with wills and
trusts) but to liquidate the assets of a debtor in decay, conflict
and opposition among the claimants are likely and present some
special problems. One aspect of these problems - the effect on
a "common fund" of an outbreak of active litigation between
adversary subgroups - will be discussed in the next section. But
whether or not they have engaged in litigation, the presence of
internal conflict raises other problems that are relevant here. For
the "common fund" doctrine rests on the premise that the costs
of litigation should be distributed, through the device of a fund,
in proportion to the benefits that the litigation produced. This
means that care is needed in tracking the incidence of benefits
where benefit to one subgroup means loss to another.
24
It is interesting that Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank,
which propelled "common funds" so vividly across the modern
sky, provides an excellent example of bungling on this issue. After
remand by the United States Supreme Court it appeared that the
bonds that Lottie Sprague had salvaged for all of the fourteen
Trust Co. v. Ward & Co., io8 Ala. 85, i8 So. 937 (1896); Davis v. Bay State
League, z58 Mass. 434, 33 N.E. 59' (x893); In re Estate of Weed, z63 Pa. 595, 30
A. 272 (1894).
121 Leggett v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 342 S.W.2d 833, 938-39 (Mo. i96o).
22

Swedish-American Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 71 Minn. 5o8, 74 N.W. 286 (1898).
But in the absence of misconduct of the receiver, Strang v. Taylor, 82 Ala. 213, 2
So. 760 (1887), refused to allow charges on the debtor's estate for services by
creditors in resisting each other's claims.
121 In Weinberg v. Goldenberg's, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1948), an attorney for a creditor formally opposed the sale of an asset at a price claimed to be
too low, and though the result was a substantial increase in the sum realized, a
charge on the proceeds was denied. In Geiger v. Peyser, 123 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir.
194), it was held not enough to propose a plan, which the receiver adopted, for
treating defrauded certificate holders; "otherwise a fund could be completely dissipated by numerous interveners eager to assist the court and its receivers." Id. at
x68. Perhaps the denial of recovery in Jett v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 228
F.2d 156 ( 4 th Cir. i955), rests on the fact that no lawsuit was brought when
creditors secured estimates from appraisers and succeeded in securing a substantial
increase in the sum realized for a particular asset.
12428 F. Supp.'229 (D. Me. 1939), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, xio F.2d
X74 (ist Cir. 1940), rev'd, 307 U.S. i6i (i939) ; see pp. x6og-io supra.
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beneficiaries had been sold for "nearly twice" the total of their
fourteen secured claims. A balance of some io,ooo dollars was still
segregated in the hands of the bank receiver, but this sum was
free of any lien and was available to pay the unsecured creditors.
The interests of secured and unsecured creditors were clearly hostile; the secured creditors had gained through Sprague's litigation
and precisely to the same extent the general creditors had lost.
Yet the award to Sprague of 1,214.51 dollars for her counsel fees
was charged, not to the money fund of the fourteen beneficiaries,
but to the io,ooo dollars which was part of the general assets and
on which the fourteen had no claim. 12 5 Then the Court of Appeals
approved an award of 1,877.3o dollars for counsel fees in establishing her right to a charge for the 1,214.51 dollars in counsel fees
that she had spent in the original litigation. Presumably the
general creditors were charged for this too." 6
Confronted with internal conflict of this kind most courts have
been much more selective, but difficulties arise. Since the beneficiaries will not be found personally liable, the operation must
be carried out through identifying funds and matching them with
beneficiaries. Litigants at times can help to make this easy, as
in a dispute over dividends as between preferred and common
stock, where one preferred stockholder secured an injunction
against paying dividends on the common stock; the corporation
then elected to deposit its earnings in a special bank account, and
when the preferred stockholders were awarded the whole amount
-- there, miraculously, was a fund, which was charged with the
fee of the enterprising litigant's lawyer. 27 More ingenuity was
.25 The issue was sharply raised on behalf of the unsecured creditors but the
court spoke soothingly: (i)the sum involved was small so that the disadvantage
to the unsecured creditors was "trivial" and (2) the unsecured creditors had recovered nearly go percent of their claims anyway. 11o F.2d at i77.
126The district court was also told that it had discretion to award counsel fees
for the appeal from the district court's denial of counsel fees in securing counsel
fees. Nothing was said about the next stage, after the remand to the district court,
i.e., whether Sprague would be awarded counsel fees incurred in establishing the
right to counsel fees for securing counsel fees.
Two other endless chain proposals of this kind that were denied were made by
lawyers (fees for themselves in securing fees for themselves). Forsyth v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 162 So. 2d gx6 (Fla. App. x964); Krause v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ils: Co., 184 Neb. 588, I69 N.W.2d 6oi (ig6g). But Cole v. Hall, 85
L.R.R.M. 2305 (E.I.N.Y. 1974), awarded a total fee of 1o,5oo dollars to lawyers
whose appeals to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court succeeded in establishing their right to counsel fees in litigation brought
to vindicate rights of free speech for labor union members; this, the court said, was
"a matter of public concern" and compensation for their services in protecting
their own fee was "in the public interest." Id. at 23o6.
127 Cintas v. American Car & Foundry Co., X33 N.J. Eq. 301, 32 A.2d
9o
(Ch. 1943), aff'd in part and rev'd in part per curiam, 135 N.J. Eq. 305, 37 A.2d
205 (Ct. Err. & App. z944).
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required where stockholders of a bank then in liquidation were
assigned in addition the superior rank of general creditors. The
court concluded that the lawyer for some stockholders who
achieved this could not be given a charge on all the free assets
since there were other general creditors as well. The solution was
to deduct the equivalent of his fifteen percent fee from the payments made by the bank liquidator to the promoted stockholders.
The liquidator was instructed then to pay directly to the successful lawyers, out of the general assets, the equivalent of the sums so
deducted. Affirmative personal liability for their shares of his fee
could not be imposed on the beneficiaries (the stockholders) but
a deduction from their claims on the "fund" was proper. 2
If the charges for fees are to be selective in this way it becomes necessary to examine with some care the economic realities
and to determine whether the "creation" or "increase" of one minifund causes subtraction from another or from the funds as a
whole. If the interests affected, though potentially hostile, were
mutually supportive in the litigation that was actually conducted,
then one group can be reimbursed for the gain of the other.'29
If analysis leads to the opposite conclusion, then the "adversary
fund" that gains through the loss of another fund will take the
whole charge. 30 On the other hand, if the success of one adversary group does not achieve the segregation of some identified
asset on which a charge can be imposed, the fund as a whole will
128 Smith v. Kroeger, 138 Ohio St. 508, 37 N.E.2d 45 (1941).
12 Leggett v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 342 S.W.2d 833, 937-39 (Mo. 196o).

Here stockholders of a life insurance company sued on behalf of themselves and
other stockholders and succeeded in extracting from the assets of a transferee corporation (which had assumed the liabilities of the transferor) more than 1,400,000

dollars which became available to pay the claims of policyholders. None of this
money was left over for any of the stockholders. But the court concluded that in
the particular litigation the priority of the policyholders was always conceded so
the claims of both groups were mutually consistent. So a lien for counsel fees was
imposed on the fund that was to be distributed to the policyholders.
But American S.S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 14 F. Supp. 941
(W.D.N.Y. 1935), aff'd mem., 82 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1936), awarded no fees because nothing was left over for the class of creditors of which the active litigants
were members, even though their lawyers succeeded in releasing assets for the
satisfaction of other lien creditors who had priority over them.
13o For examples of cases using such selective methods of allocation, see United
States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 466 F.2d 917 (2d
Cir. 1972); Crump v. Ramish, 86 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1936); Nolte v. Hudson
Navigation Co., 47 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. i93i); Central Trust Co. v. Condon, 67 F. 84,
iio (6th Cir. 1895); Muskegon Boiler Works v. Tennessee Valley Iron & R.R.,
274 F. 836 (M.D. Tenn.

1921);

Miller v. Kehoe, 107 Cal. 340, 40 P. 485 (1895);

Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Brown, 79 Md. 442, 29 A. 524 (1894); Kelly v. Mountain
City Club, ioi Tenn. 286, 47 S.W. 426 (1898); Lochte v. Blum, io Tex. Civ. App.
385, 30 S.W. 925 (I895).
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not be forced to assume it.'3 ' Nor is it enough that the lawyer
who established priority for one class of creditors clarified the
issues for the benefit of receivers and thereby rendered "aid to
the court." Reacting strongly against this suggestion, which has
met with such success in the "construction" of wills and trusts,
one court has declared that this would result in "unjust enrichment" for the lawyers if he were paid by his own clients and then
were paid a second time for the same service. 32
It seems, then, that with funds assembled to aid creditors
benefit is somewhat more strictly defined, by tests more exclusively
economic, than in the earlier group involving wills and trusts,
where enforcing the directives of private donors gives an additional reason for encouraging private litigation. But in both types
of "fund" courts clearly play an essential role in defining and
locating benefits. For in this strange nether world there is no
guidance from private contract and the ordinary law of restitution
does not fit. The need for an outside arbiter is most evident where
internal conflict causes funds to subdivide or to break up and
then reform. But the need for "court control" is continuous in
an enterprise that imposes on abstract entities called funds a
proportionate share of the costs incurred in their "creation, increase or protection."
V. CONFLICTING CLAIMS

The limitation excluding charges on funds in litigation between competing claimants is usually attributed to another decision of the Supreme Court, Hobbs v. McLean,13 3 which was
decided only five years after the Greenough case and two years
after Pettus. It appeared in this case that one Peck had contracted in his own name to supply wood to the United States
Government. To secure needed capital he entered into a partnership with two other persons, under an arrangement by which
the three partners were to share in the proceeds of the Government contract in proportion to their money contributions. Peck,
when paid by the Government less than he claimed, sued in his
own name in the Court of Claims and secured a judgment for a
.3 Commissioner v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 318 Mass. 238, 6z N.E.2d
See Abbott, Puller & Myers v. Peyser, I24 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. '94')
(interests of subgroups were so entangled that no interest could be selected as the
subject of the charge and therefore all remedy denied).
... Maurer v. International Re-ins. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 456, 95 A.2d 827 (Sup.
Ct. 1953). The court, however, conceded that the procedure of charging "common
funds," approved by "eminent authority" in the Pettus case, was "common practice in this state." Id. at 464, 95 A.2d at 831.
133 117 U.S. 567 (I886).
137 (x945).
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net sum of 35,773.63 dollars. Peck was declared bankrupt while
the case was pending on appeal. After the affirmance by the
Supreme Court and remand to the Court of Claims, Peck's assignee
in bankruptcy, Hobbs, intervened and was paid the full amount of
the judgment. The other two partners sued Hobbs for an accounting and after an extended contest established that under the
partnership agreement their contributions entitled them to the
whole sum paid to Hobbs. When Hobbs then sought an allowance
for his counsel fees in resisting the partners' suit for an accounting, he was told that Greenough did not apply because (i) he had
acted in "hostilitkr" to the two prevailing partners and (2) he
had lost.1 34 The Court added the comment that he should not
recover his counsel fees from those "whose property he sought to
misappropriate." 135
The claim of Hobbs for reimbursement for his counsel fees
was indeed as weak a claim as one could well imagine. The contest was only two-sided, the claims on each side were in direct
and total conflict (each side claimed the whole for itself), and a
losing adversary was seeking to shift his litigation costs to the
winners. It is true that Hobbs' loss in the litigation meant a corresponding gain to his opponents who, prevailed. But they prevailed because they established that they were entitled to all the
money owed by the government and that Peck and his creditors
were entitled to none. To invoke notions of enrichment and crank
up the Greenough machinery would be to introduce a new form
of general insurance to losing litigants against liability for any
counsel fees merely because their claims or defenses proved to
3 6
be unfounded.
A claim for counsel fees would be more plausible if presented
134 Id. at 581-82. The court also gave a third answer, that the assignee, Hobbs,

was apparently seeking fees for the services of lawyers in Peck's original action,
but that io,ooo dollars had already been subtracted from Peck's judgment to cover
those fees and there was no showing that the assignee himself had incurred any additional costs. Id. at 58I. There was also a fourth answer which the court did not
give: that the sum due by the judgment had been paid in full without earn~ark to
Hobbs so that the "fund" had thus been dissipated. Perhaps three answers were
enough.
It should be noted that in this case Hobbs, the client, presented the claim that
was denied.
13
Id. at 582.
136 For examples of other instances of adverse claimants who after losing were
denied charges on "common funds," see Caine v. Payne, x91 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir.
£95i); Lamar v. Hall & Wimberly, 129 F. 79 (5th Cir. x9o4); Kimball v. Atlantic
States Life Ins. Co., 223 F. 463 (S.D. Ga. IND5) ; Dent v. Foy, 214 Ala. 243, 107
SO. 210 (1925); In re Estate of Walden, 74 Cal. 776, 164 P. 639 (1917); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Brown, 79 Md. 442, 29 A. 524 (1894); McCormick v. Eisea,
107 Va. 472, 59 S.E. 411 (1907).
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by the winners against a losing adversary who retains a share in
the fund. The question would then become whether the adversary character of the litigation raises a distinct objection to the
use of the "common fund" technique. It would no doubt be an
adequate objection to say, as was said in the situations discussed
in the previous section, that if the interests are in conflict, success
for one side means no benefit for the other 137 and for a charge
against a fund a benefit is required. But more basically, if there
are really only two adversaries and no third party interests are
involved, one comes back to the rule adopted by most American
states that explicitly denies recovery of counsel fees by winners
from losers, and while it stands it should not be evaded by transparent means. 138 Even if there is a fund in which third parties as
well as the antagonists have interests, one can say (i) that the
fund receives no benefit from the resolution of their conflict and
(2) that despite the exceptions from it the policy behind the usual
rule is still accepted, so that there is an affirmative objection to
compelling losers to incur this added disadvantage, even partially
or indirectly.3 9
137 This is not always or necessarily so. We should note the strange case of

Wallace v. Fiske, 8o F.2d 897, 905-09 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 675 (1936),
where a remainderman in an inter vivos trust sued to establish that stock dividends
on stock included in the trust accrued to the remaindermen, not the life tenant. A
majority of the remaindermen opposed this contention in litigation carried through
to final decree for the plaintiff. The opposing remaindermen then discovered that
their "defeat" was enormously advantageous to them through eliminating any inheritance tax. They therefore "accepted" the result of the decree by demanding
that the distribution conform to it and by relying on it in state and federal litigation through which they escaped heavy taxation. As a result of this "acceptance"
the plaintiff's lawyer was given a fee charged to their shares in the trust. Id. at
908-09.
138 Grober v. Kahn, 47 N.J. 135, 219 A.2d 6or (I966),

was an action for an

accounting and partition brought by one partner against another, joining the latter's wife and daughters who were alleged by the plaintiff to be mere "fronts" for
his opponent. After establishing in the accounting that the principal defendant
owed some 430,0o0 dollars to the partnership, the plaintiff requested an attorney's
fee of 10o,0oo dollars to be paid by defendant out of this sum. The court hotly
rejected the suggestion: calling the partnership assets a "fund in court" was to use
fiction, and defendant's breach of fiduciary obligation made no difference; this was
an ordinary suit by one man against another. Id. at 148-51, 219 A.2d at 6o8-io.

For references to earlier decisions interpreting the New Jersey court rules in a
different way, see notes 70-72 supra.
139 None of the following cases formulate their conclusions in quite these terms
but they strongly indicate that losers sholdd not have to assume this added cost.
Ballwanz v. Jarka Corp., 382 F.2d 433 (4 th Cir. 1967); Brovn v. Pennsylvania
RR., 25o F. 5X3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 558 (xgxS); In re Estate of
Marr6, i8 Cal. 2d 191, 114 P.2d g91 (94i); Scott v. Superior Ct., 208 Cal. 3o3,
281 P. 55 (1929); Koenig v. Ward, xo4 Md. 564, 65 A. 345 (19o6); Caughman v.
Caughman, 247 S.C. 104, 146 S.E.2d 93 (I965); Gilpin v. Burrage, 188 Tenn. 8o,
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This issue takes on a different aspect, however, where the contest is with a beneficiary of the fund, who had and retains an
interest but who "loses" through defeat of his attempt to misappropriate. Must he contribute to the cost of "increasing" or
"preserving" the fund at his own expense? The problem is illustrated by a Tennessee case 140 where a widow proposed for probate a will signed by her husband, which named her the sole beneficiary and executrix. The heirs of the husband contested the will
successfully, establishing the widow's fraud and undue influence
exerted on the husband. The result was to reinstate an earlier,
valid will under which the widow took a smaller share. The court
charged the entire estate with the fees of the lawyers for the
husband's heirs, brushing aside the widow's protest that she had
suffered a net loss. On one view of the case, the contest was
merely between competing claimants and it accomplished at most
a redistribution between them, adding nothing to the estate. But
if the estate, again, is thought of as an entity which the successful
contest by the husband's heirs "protected," it becomes irrelevant
that the widow is compelled to contribute indirectly to the cost
of accomplishing her own defeat. And surely the result was laudable, for it would be difficult to justify an exemption merely because it was a beneficiary rather than some third person who was
engaged in looting the estate.
Several other courts have used the same technique where the
wrongdoing of the defeated beneficiary was approximately of the
same degree.'4 1 At times, however, it seems to have been enough
that the adverse claim was merely proven unfounded, if its defeat
"increased" or "protected" a fund. 42 This, however, is not at
2z6 S.W.2d 732 (1948); Kelly v. Mountain City Club, ioi Tenn. 286, 47 S.W. 426
(1898); Chapin v. Colard, 29 Wash. 2d 788, 189 P.2d 642 (1948).

In Bartholomew v. Union Trust Co., 36 Ind. App. 328, 75 N.E. 31 (i9o5), a

lawyer argued, without success, that establishing the validity of his client's mortgage was helpful to the receiver in the particular case and to other receiverships as
well, by establishing a clear rule in aid of administration so that "many similar
claims . . . were expeditiously settled without litigation." Id. at 330, 75 N.E. at
32. When this line of argument failed, the lawyer argued that he should have a
fee because the receiver had sent other claimants to him to explain the effect of
the decision and he had advised them to settle in accordance therewith. On this
the somewhat wry comment was that his duty to his clients was "not consistent
with the payment of his fees by the opposite party." Id. at 331, 75 N.E. at 32.
140 Smith v. Hake, 138 Tenn. 255, 197 S.W. 678 (1917).
141 Tevander v. Ruysdael, 299 F. 746 (Tth Cir. 1924); Louisville

Presbyterian

Theolog. Sem. v. Botto, 117 Ky. 962, 8o S.W. 177 (1904); Fidelity Union Trust Co.
v. Berenblum, 9i N.J. Super. 551, 221 A.2d 758 (App. Div. i966); In re Estate of
Hirsch, X54 Misc. 736, 278 N.Y.S. 255 (Sur. Ct. 1935). The Tevander case in-

volved only two partners and on its facts seems not distinguishable from Grober
v. Kahn, 47 N.J. 135, 219 A.2d 6oi (1966), see note 138 supra.
142 City of Wewoka v. Banker, 117 F.2d 839 (ioth Cir. 1941) (court disregards
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all clear for at other times the veil of the fund has been pierced
and the shares of claimants who have incurred
net loss have been
1 43
exempted from any charge for counsel fees.
Thus the protection of the fund does not provide a compelling
reason for awarding counsel fees where the threat of depletion
comes from one who is also a beneficiary. There is another
reason for restraint in making such an award. Ever since the
Pettus case in 1884 it has been accepted that lawyers' claims
against funds are independent of and in addition to any claims
of their clients to contribution. What is seldom discussed is the
potential this creates for conflict of interest. This would be immediately evident if one were to say that lawyers employed by
losers had claims for fees against the winning opponents for the
gain to the winners through their own clients' loss; the incentive
to promote their clients' interests would be, to say the least, diluted. But the same is true if fees are paid by funds which other
persons beneficially own, especially if the funds grow large and
the fees, as usual, are inflated in proportion.
One decision that confronts this issue is Gabrielson v. City of
Long Beach,' 4 an action brought in the name of one Mrs. Swart
who claimed rights in land located beneath the harbor of Long
Beach, California. Mrs. Swart had filed in 1939 with the United
States Land Office an application for an oil and gas lease of
640 acres of this submerged land. The 64o acre tract had been
part of the land earlier granted by the State of California to the
City of Long Beach, under the belief, generally held at that time,
that the tidelands were owned by the states. In 1947 the United
States Supreme Court held the contrary, that the United States
and not the states had paramount rights in the marginal seas."'L
Shortly thereafter the United States Department of the Interior
denied the Swart application, but she persisted in litigation in
Washington, D.C., to compel its approval.
contention that creditor is worse off by being deprived of an illegal priority payment); Anniston Loan & Trust Co. v. Ward & Co., to8 Ala. 85, i8 So. 937 (1895)
(creditor of an insolvent debtor, who resisted a contention that a mortgage made
to it by the debtor was a preference, was described as a "trustee" who must bear
the cost of litigation made necessary by his "delinquency" in contesting the claims
of his cestuis que trust) ; In re Weed's Estate, 163 Pa. 595, 598-99, 30 A. 272, 273

(1894) (creditor battled "stubbornly" to retain a preferential transfer of land
made on behalf of an insolvent debtor and the court blamed the debtor's "greed"
for making a lawsuit necessary); Kauffman v. Hunt, 65 Pa. D. & C. 566 (C.P.
1948) (transferees who took in trust benefited through proof of trust despite defeat of their claim of full ownership).
'43 Simmons v. Friday, igo F.2d 849 (8th Cir. i951); Koenig v. Ward, io4
Md. 564, 65 A. 345 (I9o6); In re Estate of Winburn, z6o Misc. 49, 51-52, 289
N.Y.S. 717, 7,9-20 (Sur. Ct. x936).
14456 Cal. 2d 224, 363 P.2d 883, 14 Cal. Rptr. 65i (ig6I).
45 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (I947).
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When in 1953 the Congress granted to the states a three-mile
belt of submerged lands there was a saving clause for rights previously acquired. 46 So Mrs. Swart's lawyer, Gabrielson, persisted. He intervened in an action pending in a California state
court in support of an injunction against expenditure by the City
of Long Beach of revenues from oil and gas extracted from the
submerged lands. This injunction was found by the court to be
a holding operation in aid of Mrs. Swart's pending application
for a federal grant, but in order to secure it Gabrielson was led
to contest the constitutionality and construction of state legislation under which gas and oil revenues had been transferred by
the state to the City of Long Beach. His attack on constitutionality failed but an argument that he alone presented, going to
the construction of one of the statutes, was accepted by the state
supreme court. The final result was that the state was held to be
entitled, and the city not entitled, to 2oo,ooo,ooo dollars in accumulated revenue.
Gabrielson petitioned for a fee to be charged to this fund but
the trial court denied the petition. The supreme court affirmed
in an opinion by Justice Traynor, who pointed out that the purpose of the original action had not been to create or preserve a
common fund, but rather to advance adverse personal interests.
Such litigation, he reasoned, calls for no additional recovery of
fees charged against the fund should the ultimate object -fail. In
addition, permitting such recovery could create a conflict of interest between lawyer and client; an attorney retained to establish a right adverse to the fund might be inclined to forsake that
claim of his client in the hope of obtaining greater fees from the
fund.

47

This analysis projected the court into a complex inquiry into
motives. Gabrielson contended that by the time he mounted his
attack on the California state legislation all hope had been abandoned of establishing his client's rights in the submerged 640
acre tract which the City of Long Beach claimed by grant from
the state. If hope had in fact been entirely abandoned it would
then appear that Gabrielson's intervention in the California taxpayer's suit was motivated solely, as he claimed, by the purpose
of preventing unlawful expenditures of public funds. The finding
of the trial court, accepted by the supreme court, was that depriving the city and state of the 64o acre tract remained the
"ultimate objective" and that this was enough to defeat his claim
for counsel fees.
There was also another troublesome point that the court did
"'See Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
""'56 Cal. 2d at 229-30, 363 P.2d at 886, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 654.
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not discuss because it did not need to. Gabrielson injected a new
issue of statutory construction into the taxpayer's suit. It was
by prevailing on this issue that he "created" the 200,000,000
dollars fund (in fact the result was merely to transfer it from city
to state). But any contest over the fund between city and state
seemingly had no bearing whatever on his client's rights to the
64o acre tract. Should a lawyer become entitled to an extra reward, measured in some part by the size of the fund produced,
for dragging in and winning on an extraneous issue on which third
parties have a tremendous stake? 148 If this can occur the incentive to serve his client's interests with utmost diligence might be
almost as much impaired as if the conflict of interest were direct.
The possibilities of contamination are suggested by a Tennessee case which deserves a special museum of its own. It involved
a widow's contest, on grounds of insanity and undue influence,
of two instruments executed on the same day by her deceased
husband, one a will and the other an inter vivos trust. Her action
to set aside the trust was tried first and resulted in a decree for
the widow. As the court stated, there was "every reason to believe" that the will contest if pursued would have succeeded
on the same grounds of insanity and undue influence. But the
widow's lawyers advised her to enter into a settlement with the
principal beneficiary of the will, the American Red Cross. She
followed their advice and agreed to take one-third of her husband's iio,ooo dollar estate, the other two-thirds to go to the Red
Cross. She had already paid her lawyers the fee agreed upon
with them, but they sought and received an additional fee of ten
percent of the whole estate. The court argued that a fund had
been preserved, for if the will contest had succeeded, as seemed
extremely probable, the executors appointed in the will would
have had no estate to administer and the Red Cross would have
taken nothing. By advising their client to settle, the widow's
lawyers "acted directly in the interest of the American Red Cross"
and 14preserved for it a large sum that it would otherwise have
lost. 9 It is plain that the interests of the widow and the Red
Cross were mutually hostile at every stage. It seems truly aston148 Gabrielson, it should be noted, did not admit that the rights of the state
against the City of Long Beach were an extraneous issue. He contended that he
had consistently sought to advance the state's interest, in particular because he
believed the representation of that interest by the state Attorney General, who
intervened only at a very late stage, to be seriously inadequate. Id. at 231-32,
393 P.2d at 888, x4 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
149 Carmack v. Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co., i8o Tenn. 571, 177 S.W.2d 351
(x944). The court then went on to say: "We do not mean to imply that they acted
against the interest of their client in so doing. The compromise settlement appears
to have been for the best interest of both parties." Id. at 578, 177 S.W.2d at 353-54.
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ishing that her lawyers should secure an extra reward, not from
their client but from her opponent, for advising her to abandon
her claim. Fortunately only one other case comes within hailing
distance of this aberration. 150
Aberrations of this kind are of course due to the original
aberration of the Supreme Court in the Pettus case, in recognizing direct and independent claims of lawyers for extra rewards
for merely performing their contracts with their clients. When
conflict arises between claimed beneficiaries of a "common fund"
the fund must be broken up and subdivided along these lines of
conflicting interests. The courts have shown much skill in these
maneuvers. What the courts have not shown, except in California,
is awareness of the risk that the motives of lawyers may well be
corrupted when they are left so free to go off on frolics of their
own. This risk would not have existed if the counsel fees required
for successful litigation were chargeable to its beneficiaries only
through a claim by its promoter, the client, for contribution to his
actual costs.
VI. ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF BENEFITS

In numerous situations where contract or restitution remedies
encounter a barrier that seems impenetrable a trapdoor is found
- "acceptance" of a benefit by the recipient. An acceptance can
occur in several different ways: an expression of acquiescence
which amounts to a promise before the event or perhaps to a new
promise after the event, "standing by" while aware that the benefit is being conferred, or retention where its return would be feasible and not costly. One or another form of acceptance will
ordinarily lead to personal liability; if assent is thought to be
needed, it is inferred from conduct. The Greenough-Pettus machinery, however,. which fastens on "funds," did not originate in
or depend on any notion of acceptance by the ultimate receivers.
In the "common fund" cases it is rarely mentioned though often
1'°In re Faling's Estate, zI3 Ore. 6,

228

P.

821

(1924).

This again was a

will contest by a contestant who claimed to be sole heir of the testatrix. His claim
was therefore adverse to that of a charity, the Children's Home, which was given
a legacy of 3ooo dollars in the contested will. After most of the evidence was in, an
earlier will was discovered under which the Children's Home had a 400,ooo dollars
legacy. The lawyers for the heir at first opposed the probate of that will also, but
then switched and supported its probate. The will first attacked was then held
invalid, the earlier will was probated, and the lawyers for the heir (who had already paid them in full) were given an additional fee, charged against the whole
estate. Id. at 36, 228 P. at 83x. The court found that they had "created or preserved" the estate, though they had opposed its creation until a very late stage,
as their duty to their client required. There is no indication whether the prospect
of an extra fee influenced their advice to their client that he switch his position.
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it is no doubt presupposed. 51 - However, it is always available
where benefits accrue through legal services rendered under contract with another. At times it is most appropriate to use it, as
in a case in which a legatee with a 2oo dollar legacy not only
accepted but demanded 2,5oo dollars, as a condition to her needed
consent to settlement of a will contest. With a payment thus
actively coerced it would seem that the least she should contribute
was a fee for the other parties' lawyers.15 2 There are other instances also where acceptance has been found through active personal assistance to the litigation by an interested third party plus
retention of its proceeds. 53
A more complex question is raised where proceeds are received or retained by third parties, beneficiaries, but some or all
of them opposed the litigation and expressly refused to participate. This could occur though their own economic interest in
the outcome was in no way hostile and they would gain affirmatively through success. This combination appeared in the wellknown case of Felton v. Finley.'14 Here one Coleman had left a
will bequeathing 5oo dollars to each of his three nephews and three
nieces and most of the rest of his estate to charitable organizations. Two nephews out of the group of six employed lawyer
Felton to contest the will. Before filing suit lawyer Felton sent
to the other four siblings a copy of his contract with the two
nephews, providing for a contingent fee of fifty percent. They
did not reply and when requested by the two nephews to sign up
all four replied with emphatic negatives: "I will have nothing to
do with it," "I am having nothing whatever to do with a dead
man's money," "Forget about [me]," and "I am not going to
151 Petition of Crum,

i96 S.C. 528, 14 S.E.2d 21

(941),

made as much of this

as most courts would find necessary. After pointing out that the third parties,

beneficiaries of the litigation, actually attended some of the court hearings in which
their rights were eventually established, the court stated that "[t]hat they will
accept the benefits derived thereunder goes without question." Id. at 533, 14 S.E.2d
at 24.
1'52 Thompson v. Smith, 268 S.W.2d 653

(Ky. 1954). She had been joined
as a named party in the probate proceeding so that her consent to the settlement of a will contest was necessary. The court's figure of speech suggests Greenough: "When she demanded and obtained a generous slice of the compromise cake,
she impliedly promised to pay the bakers." Id. at 653-54. Again, the lawyers were
assumed to be the "bakers" though the ones who should recover were their clients
(the other distributees) since they were the ones who were forced to pay extra.
15 Bogorad v. Schwarz, 2o8 F.2d 704 (4 th Cir. 1953); Manning v. Owens, 277
Ky. 40, 125 S.W.2d 753 (1939);. Hultman v. Hanley, 124 Neb. 757, 248
N.W. 81 (1933). McMullin v. Klein, 468 S.W.2d 657 (Mo. Ct. App, 1971), in-

volved no active participation in the litigation by the person benefited but rather
acceptance of the money proceeds of a settlement plus express agreement to the
terms of the settlement itself. Numerous cases on the general topic of "acceptance"
of lawyers' services are collected in Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 38 (1961).
1 69 Idaho 381, 209 P.2d 899 (949).
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[sign]." 1"5 One sister was very religious and it was hinted that
religion was one reason for her refusal.
Lawyer Felton proceeded with the contest, which was partially successful; the gifts to the charities were held invalid because included in a will that was executed less than thirty days
before the testator's death. This meant that the assets intended for
the charities passed to the six nephews and nieces by intestacy.
When checks were made out for their distributive shares minus
the fees claimed by Felton, the reluctant four overcame their
scruples.and cashed the checks. On first hearing the Supreme
Court of Idaho held by a 3-2 vote that lawyer Felton had a lien
for his fees on the funds still held in the decedent's estate. 156 But
on rehearing two judges switched and the court held 4-1 that
acceptance by the four did not create an "implied contract," that
Felton had merely performed the services called for by his own
contract with the two nephews, and that he knew when he performed them that the abstaining four would not employ him, were
opposed to the contest, and would not, did not, have anything to do
with it.157 The difficulty then was that they did have something
signed and cashed the checks. Up to that
to do with it -they
point they had had a choice: to let the money go to some other
takers under a gift over or residuary clause or, if the will had no
such provision, then to let the money escheat to the state. In substance they had one choice if they were to escape Felton's claim
for a fee - to abandon the assets that he had proved to be theirs.
An express refusal to employ a particular lawyer in pending
litigation should at least have the effect, if the refusal is consistently maintained, of excluding personal liability to that lawyer
on "implied contract." 158 But this was not the issue in Felton v.
Finley. The issue was whether a charge on a fund "created" by
the litigation should be permitted where there is subsequent acceptance of the money proceeds. 159 When this issue has been
15 5

Id. at 383-84, 209 P.2d at 899-g0o.

15 I d. at 385-86, 209 P.2d at
15 7

goi.

Id. at 388, 209 P.2d at 902-03.
158 Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 18o S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1971).
Here a trustee had brought an action to construe a will. One beneficiary, whose
share as finally determined was estimated at 400,o0o dollars, refused to employ the
lawyer who served the other distributees, saying she considered it the trustee's duty
to construe the will. She was held not to be personally liable to the lawyer. Id. at
54. See also Coleman v. United States, X52 U.S. 96 (1894).
115 In Felton v. Finley, 69 Idaho 381, 209 P.2d 899 (1949), the trial court found

an "implied contract of employment" and both opinions in the Supreme Court use
"implied contract," suggesting that Felton sought to impose personal liability on
the four abstainers. But the issue as to fees arose in an independent action based
on a stipulation of the parties. The complaint incorporated the language of Felton's
original complaint; in this he had asked merely for a lien on the sums held by the
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raised in a somewhat different context the fund has been charged;
acceptance of the proceeds then has the effect of cancelling out
whatever effect the express rejection might have had. °0 Likewise,
in other situations a more generalized opposition to the litigation
or its objectives, without express refusal to participate, has not
given immunity if the litigation later succeeded. Certainly where
the opponents are numerous but divided, opposition by a majority
will not have that effect.'
In at least one case the shares of the
opponents were charged though they were as united in their opposition as were the four abstainers in Felton. 62 Here too the result is not made to depend on "acceptance," from which a subsequent assent is inferred, but rather on a finding that on an objective
view and under the usual tests a benefit has accrued to the fund.0 3
probate court. Also the stipulation stated that the issue on the appeal was "'whether
or not J.H. Felton . . . had a lien' on the distributive shares" of the heirs. Id. at
387, 209 P.2d at 902.
6 Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Combs, 249 Ark. 533, 460 S.W.2d 770
(1970) ; United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Hills, 272 Neb. 128, 2o9 NAV.2d 174 (2962).
Both these cases involved claims of insurers partially subrogated to tort claims,
but one reason given in the second of these cases was that compliance with the
insurer's demand that its claim be deleted from the insured's tort action was impossible since rules against splitting causes of action would in any event produce
merger in the judgment of both the insured's personal injury claim and the insurer's
property damage claim.
There are dicta in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 237 So. 2d 2o8
(Fla. Ct. App. 1970), that the insurer's refusal to employ the insured's lawyer
should be given effect, but the court also found no benefit to the insurer through a
deposit in court of a check that it had not cashed. Id. at 209-10.
"' Buford v. Tobacco Growers' Co-op Ass'n, 42 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1930)
(receivership opposed by a large percentage of the membership); Kimbrough
v. Dickinson, 251 Ala. 677, 39 So. 2d 241 (1949) (33 out of 49 next of kin supported claims of an executrix to ownership of the estate but the fund was held to
be "preserved" by defeat of her claim); Leggett v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co.,
342 S.W.2d 833, 936-39 (Mo. I96O) (most of the policyholders apparently supported the corporation in suit by stockholders against the corporation that brought
large gains to policyholders) ; In re Estate of Engebretson, 68 S.D. 255, 1 N.W.2d
351 (i94I) (one distributee defeated a claim against the estate though he acted
in opposition to a "majority" of the heirs).
162 Lovrien v. Fitzgerald, 245 Iowa 2325, 66 N.W.2d 458 (X954) (one remainderman successfully opposed a claim asserted by a life tenant, who was supported by
all the other four remaindermen). But see McGraw v. Canton, 74 Md. 554, 22 A.
232 (189x)
(one heir succeeded in cancelling a deed made by the decedent in his
lifetime). In denying a charge on the decedent's estate in McGraw, the court seems
to have been influenced by the opposition to the proceeding by all the heirs, but
the language used in the opinion seems to be a survival from pre-Greenough days.
6I This is characteristic of the cases cited in notes 139, 240 supra. A slightly
different, perhaps stronger, reason for an objective view appeared in Ewing v.
First Nat'l Bank, 209 Ga. 932, 76 S.E.2d 791 (x953), and Jesser v. Mayfair
Hotel, Inc., 360 S.W.2d 6g2 (Mo. x962). In both these cases a disposition of
trust assets that trustees proposed and the litigation prevented would have been
more profitable to the beneficiaries and was therefore supported by all (in Ewing)
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But if the benefit is clear, though in the particular case unexpected, a belated appropriation of an increased "fund" has been
held to override and cancel out even strenuous opposition, shown
in adversary litigation pursued to the bitter end." 4 One is driven
to conclude that Felton v. Finley, in respecting the reluctance of
the abstainers to interfere with "a dead man's money," shows a
solicitude for personal scruples that other courts would find excessive. These contests are over funds and funds cannot have
scruples.
The workings of the Greenough machinery are not quite inexorable, for the third party, the potential beneficiary, can probably escape it if he has hired and paid his own attorney to take
part actively in the litigation. This can be considered an implied
rejection of any service to him by the mover of the litigation or
his attorney. But it is more than this. It means that the ride for
him is not free and that he becomes a contributor to the final
result, so that two essential bases of the Greenough doctrine are
eliminated. Immunity for this reason is occasionally mentioned
as a supportive argument when other objections can be stated,16 5
but it is also relied on by itself to deny a recovery where, without
it, the Greenough machinery would have operated.' 6 6
or most (in Jesser) of them, but the disposition would have been an unlawful deviation from the trust and preventing this was held to be a benefit to the fund.
• "' Wallace v. Fiske, 8o F.2d 897, gog-og (8th Cir. 1936). This is the peculiar
case referred to above, see note x37 supra, in which defeat in protracted adversary
proceedings brought wealth to the losers. Here the plaintiff, one of nine remaindermen, contended and eventually established that stock dividends on stock held in
trust accrued to the remaindermen. In this contention he had the support of two
but the vigorous opposition of six other remaindermen who were joined in the
litigation and hired their own attorneys. The six adversaries who "lost" then demanded distribution of their shares in the trust in conformity to the decree and
invoked it successfully in protracted litigation in escaping state and federal inheritance taxes. They were held liable for fees to plaintiff's lawyer through this
"acceptance."
16 Scott v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. 303, 281 P. 55 (1929) (the contest is between adversaries); Kelly v. Mountain City Club, ioi Tenn. 286, 47 S.W. 426
(1898) (same); In re Winburn's Estate, i6o Misc. 49, 289 N.Y.S. 717 (Sur. Ct.
1936); Lea v. Paterson Say. Inst., 142 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1944); In re Baxter's
Estate, 94 Mont. 257, 22 P.2d 182 (1933).
It should be noted, however, that in Wallace v. Fiske, 8o F.2d 897 (8th Cir.
1936), see note 164 supra, "acceptance" by the "defeated" adversaries overrode
the fact that in the principal litigation they had hired their own attorneys.
166 Haynes v. Rederi A/S Aladdin, 362 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Fletcher v.
Coomes, 285 F. 893 (D.C. Cir. 1922); In re Estate of Bullock, 133 Cal. App. 2d
542, 284 P.2d 960 (Dist. Ct. 1955); Pontiac Mut. County Fire & Lightning Ins.
Co. v. Sheibley, 279 Ill.IS,i6 N.E.- 644 (1917); Wylie v. City Comm'n, 297
Mich. 365, 297 N.W. 526 (i94i); In re Kierstead's Estate, 121 Neb. 423, 237 N.W.
299 (xg3x); In re Loomis, 273 N.Y. 76, 6 N.E.2d 1O3 (I937).
Strong dicta to the same effect appear in Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
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Difficulties arise and predictions become difficult where the
lawyer who initiated the litigation and the lawyer employed by
the beneficiary make contributions that are manifestly unequal.
This may be the explanation of two will contest cases already
mentioned 167 in which the charities that ultimately benefited
most had sat on the sidelines until a very late stage and then employed lawyers who seemingly contributed little; the fact that
the charities had their own lawyers was simply ignored. 8 A
comparable Kentucky case involved claims of eleven shareholders who had "pooled" their shares and transferred them to a
bank, which paid forty dollars a share and promised to pay more
on certain contingencies. 1 A controversy between the transferors
and the bank then arose over whether more payments were due.
At a meeting of the eleven, three transferors disclosed the names of
lawyers they had hired and the other eight were "given an opportunity" to employ them also but none did. After the litigation
begun in the names of the three had progressed for some months
and was on the verge of success, the eight intervened through
lawyers they had employed and claimed their shares in the lump
sum tendered by the bank by way of settlement. The lawyers
for the three contended that this "acceptance" of benefits justified a charge on the fund for their fees. The Greenough case
had previously been approved with enthusiasm in Kentucky 17 0
but the court proceeded to give a whole salvo of reasons which
would totally and forever outlaw from the state any "common
funds" of the Greenough type. 1 71 One might be tempted to read
v. Hammett, 237 Ark. 954, 377 S.W.2d 8ix (1964), and Forsyth v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 162 So. 2d 916 (Fla. App. 1964).
167
See In re Faling's Estate, 113 Ore. 6, 228 P. 821 (X924), discussed in note
ixo supra; Carmack v. Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co., i8o Tenn. 571, X77 S.W.2d 351
(1944), discussed in note 149 supra.
168This was clearest in In re Faling's Estate, 113 Ore. 6, 228 P. 82X (X924),

where the charity (the Children's Home) itself pointed out that eleven-twelfths of
the testimony in the contest of the later, invalid will had been taken, without the
charity's participation, in several months of trial before discovery of the earlier,
valid will under which the charity took a bequest of 400,000 dollars. In Carmack
v. Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co., i8o Tenn. 571, 177 S.W.2d 351 (944), the charity,
the Red Cross, was apparently not involved at all in the crucial litigation that set
aside the trust. One hopes that the Red Cross did not pay any fee to the opponent's
lawyer for advising his client to settle with the Red Cross.
"0 O'Doherty & Yonts v. Bickel, x66 Ky. 708, X79 S.W. 484 (19X5).
1"0Farmer's
Bank & Trust Co. v. Stanley, i9o Ky. 762, 228 S.W. 691 (1921);
Louisville Presbyterian Theolog. Sem. v. Botto, 117 Ky. 962, 8o S.W. 177 (2904).
171 The reasons included: (i) the lawyer-claimants had merely performed their
contracts with their own clients; (2) any benefits to the eight were merely incidental benefits that accrued necessarily from the performance plaintiffs were obligated to render; (3) the eight merely sought to collect the sums owed them; and
(4) they had no choice, for if they were ever to enforce their claims against the
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this as a roundabout way of saying that beneficiaries of litigation
can purchase immunity from the Greenough treatment by hiring
and paying their own lawyers,
though the court was explicit that
72
this was not what it meant.
One alternative is for a court, having "control" over the fund,
to undertake to apportion fees according to the relative contributions of active and less active counsel. This can occur, for example, where lawyers for fiduciary and distributee cooperate in
ways that are helpful to both. 78 If one lawyer is almost wholly
inactive a justification could be manufactured by "implying"
assent by the clients to some alterations in the scale of fees, at
least insofar as they are to be charged to funds. 4 One court
that faced these choices and refused to become involved 17' had
before it another will contest, in which out of thirty-two distributees named in an earlier will, twenty-four challenged a will
proposed for probate, all twenty-four having employed lawyers on
a contingent fee basis. By the challenged will most of the decedent's estate, valued at approximately 140,ooo dollars, had been
left to two other legatees, who after skirmishes in court for several
months agreed to relinquish their claims in return for 5,0oo dollars.
It was conceded that one of the lawyers, representing five o the
will's opponents, had done "the lion's share" of the work in securing this favorable settlement. The California Court of Appeal
nevertheless concluded that the Greenough doctrine, which it fully
accepted, did not apply here. By employing their own lawyers the
other beneficiaries had eliminated the grounds that justified
Greenough: the unfairness of receiving gains without sharing the
cost of acquiring them, the undue risk and expense born by the

bank they must necessarily profit from the litigation brought by the three. See i66
Ky. at 712, 179 S.W. at 850.
172 The court of appeals asserted that the defendants in this instance had "rejected" plaintiffs' services, but it was careful to add that the result did not rest on
the fact that some of the defendants had hired their own counsel who advised
them throughout. Id. at 713-15, 179 S.W. at 850-51.
17I See In re Schwint's Estate, 183 Okla. 439, 83 P.2d 161 (1938).
174 Nolte v. Hudson Navigation CO., 47 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 193i), was a contest
in a creditors' bill between secured and unsecured creditors. As to 73 percent of
the unsecured claims the creditors were represented by other lawyers. In reversing
the lower court, which had denied any allowance to the lawyers who had taken
the initiative, the court said:
Of course one who has an attorney may be shown to have expressly or
impliedly consented to be represented, nevertheless, by the attorneys for
other creditors who alone are active and achieve the beneficial result. In that
event such creditors, notwithstanding that they were nominally represented
by counsel, should share proportionally in the expense.
Id. at 168.
17 In re Estate of Korthe, 9 Cal. App. 3d 572, 88 Cal. Rptr. 46S (1970).
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active litigant, and the value of an incentive to his lawyer by
assuring the lawyer prompt payment in the event of success. Any
inequity, it appeared, resulted from equal pay for unequal work
by the lawyers but this, the court said, could only be prevented by
arrangements the lawyers made between themselves. The situation, arising often, could be illustrated by a common disaster, such
as the crash of a commercial airliner, where there are numerous
claims but a single attorney through much effort succeeds in his
conduct of a consolidated trial: "unless he has an agreement with
other counsel, he must look to his own client for a fee." 176
One court had previously come to a more adventurous solution in the very situation that the California court imagined. In
Doherty v. Bress 17 the court seems also to have assumed that
merely hiring inactive lawyers will give their clients immunity,
but concluded that the lawyer who pulled the laboring oar could
still recover from the inactive lawyers for their free ride. In that
case, numerous wrongful death actions were brought in the District
of Columbia by representatives of passengers killed in a midair
collision over the National Airport in Washington. The plaintiffs
in these actions, in a stipulation approved by the trial judge,
agreed that one pair of cases (the Miller cases) should proceed to
trial as test cases on the issue of the fault of the United States and
Eastern Airlines, the two defendants. The stipulation provided
that as to that issue, the decision in the Miller cases should be
conclusive on all the parties to the stipulation. Bress, the lawyer
employed in the Miller cases, secured the agreement of many
of the litigants that he would represent them also, but the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., having its own lawyer for its
claim as subrogee of one of the dead passengers, expressly refused
to employ Bress. After a trial had established that both defendants
were at fault, Hartford's own lawyer, Doherty, secured a 14,500
dollar settlement of Hartford's claim and for this the trial court
awarded him a 2,900 dollar fee to be paid by Hartford. 7 8 Bress
then filed a petition to secure "the reasonable and fair value" of
his services and was awarded 1,oi5 dollars, or thirty-five percent,
of Doherty's fee from Hartford, Doherty's own fee being reduced
17

6Id. at 577, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
177 262 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 934 (1959).
178 The court's power to fix Doherty's fee rested on Act of June 25, 1948, ch,
646, § 2678, 62 Stat. 984 (now 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1970)), which authorizes trial
courts to award lawyer's fees in amounts totaling not more than 20o of the
recovery to be paid "out of" the amount of the recovery in tort claims against
the United States Government. The statute, of course, had nothing to say concerning redistribution of fees between the various lawyers, and for this the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia relied on Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank,
307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939). See pp. i6og-io supra.
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by that amount. The court's explanation was that the success of
Bress in the test cases had benefited Hartford and that Hartford
had "enlisted" his services by joining in the stipulation that made
the test cases decisive of the issue of fault.17 9 In substance, however, contribution was enforced, not from Hartford, but from
Doherty, Hartford's lawyer, whose task in negotiating a settlement had been greatly simplified when fault was established. The
court assumed without discussion that Hartford itself was immune.
There is some irony in the thought that the Greenough-Pettus
machinery of the "common fund," which has extracted so much
from strangers for the enrichment of the legal profession, can be
reversed and turned against other lawyers to generate such internecine strife. In the end the decision may turn out to be merely
a freak. It can be explained in part by the statutory power of
the trial judge to determine what shares all the lawyers would
be given in the tort judgment against the government.'" Surely
much depended also on the express agreement by all plaintiffs
and defendants that the test cases would determine the issue of
fault.18 ' Doherty v. Bress has seldom been cited subsequently

and seems almost to have dropped out of sight. I have found only
one case in which a lawyer has used it in an active effort to redivide the lawyers' own pie. This effort failed, the reasons given
being that the lawyers concerned had represented distinct groups
of clients whose contentions differed, were at times mutually hostile, and contributed in ways that were hard to measure. 2 So it
maybe that the gate left ajar by Doherty v. Bress will lead nowhere. But who can be sure since the gate is not locked?
VII.

CONCLUSION

The material so far presented does not provide a sufficient
basis either for appraising the total contribution made by the
"common fund" device or for predicting the future paths of its
active satellites. For the latter purpose, in particular, it will be
179 262 F.2d at 22.

110 See note x78 supra.
'81 The court in Doherty v. Bress explained the result through the trial court's
"equitable discretion" and "the power of equity in doing justice," 262 F.2d at 22,
though the action was plainly for damages with no invocation of equity powers.
In a later attempt to explain how Bress could recover, Schleit v. British Overseas
Airways Corp., 4IO F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. i969), aff'g 283 F. Supp. 99 (D.D.C. x968),
the court described the joining by Hartford in the test case as an "implied agreement of the parties to enlist his services." 41o F.2d at 262 n.2. It was not stated
that Doherty, Hartford's lawyer, joined in the contract. Was Hartford's obligation
to Doherty discharged or scaled down?
182 Schmidt v. McCarthy, 369 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (a late stage in the
complex litigation over the reconstruction of the Teamsters' Union).
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necessary to observe the uses to which the common fund has been
put in litigation that is not devoted mainly to serving private inpurports to promote
terests, as in that so far examined, but8 that
3
public interests in much greater degree.
The common fund doctrine emerged in situations where the
interests of litigants and outsiders were so closely interlocked
that success in the litigation inevitably brought evident and
measurable gains to the outsiders. This was true in the Greenough and Pettus cases which, in much of this discussion, have
served as prototypes. Also, in both those cases the litigation actively promoted the aims of enterprises that were directed and
"controlled" by courts. Under the usual rules that exclude counsel fees from recoverable costs, the unavoidable expense of the
successful litigation was a loss that the winner was expected to
bear. It is not surprising that in the Greenough case the opportunity given by the court's administrative control through receivership was seized and the loss that was necessary to produce
gain was charged to the assets in receivership.
In other, very different contexts where the promotion of selfinterest inevitably brings gain to others, the promoter's claim for
restitution of the unsolicited gain of the others will ordinarily
have low grade appeal. This surely is not because the promotion
of self-interest is suddenly thought to deserve reproach or discredit but is presumably because self-interest provides both a
sufficient explanation and sufficient incentive for the gain-producing activity. Why should courts intervene? But if the interests of all are so closely interlocked as is now supposed, the actor
is in a dilemma, for he cannot advance his own interests without
advancing those of others; and if one looks to the other side, the
passive receiver is not particularly deserving. And so where the
gain of the receiver is matched with and traceable to the producer's loss and an opportunity appears to redress this imbalance,
the prevention of enrichment through another's loss reasserts its
appeal. As an aspiration it could never be fully realized but its
appeal is persistent. It becomes a strong motive force where it4
can be readily achieved without further large-scale commitment.
One of the main arguments presented here has been that the
reasons justifying the Greenougl solution - contribution to the
successful litigant's costs in counsel fees - were and are compelling but that none of them applies to the independent and
paramount lien of the lawyer that originated in the Pettus case.
The lawyer cannot show that he suffered a loss that was a source
1s3 I will discuss attorney fees in public interest litigation in a future article.
184 This general thesis is advanced in Dawson, supra note 7, especially at 148.
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of gain to others, since all his rights to payment by his client are
preserved unimpaired and his recovery from the fund is extra. It
seems likely that the Pettus case was simply an oversight by a
court that was quite unaware of what it was doing. But the reception given the Pettus case can only be explained by the strong
fellow-feeling of judges for brothers in the guild. Similar bounty
sought by other kinds of professionals or indeed by anyone else
in the population is uniformly denied, so abruptly as a rule that
the claim seems to be thought not worthy of discussion.'8 5 The
client's claim for contribution has a built-in ceiling, the costs
that he has in fact incurred. There is no such ceiling for the
lawyer's claim, which is usually fixed by a test of market value,
determined in a market in which lawyers are accustomed to sharing the profits of risky litigation by express contracts for contingent fees.
The "common fund" then is in practice a device whose purposes are (i) to augment the income of lawyers and (2) to distribute the added cost that is thus created among the beneficiaries
of litigation. In accomplishing both purposes judges play a crucial role: they will determine the extra income to be awarded in
a free evaluation uncontrolled by contract, and more importantly,
they will decide the distribution of costs among beneficiaries. This
is a judicial function, and is crucial. As we have seen, funds can be
created in many different ways, take many different forms, and,
in effect, vanish or break up where there is internal conflict. Court
control can be exerted also in various ways - indirectly or remotely, by directions to intermediaries or by adjudication of the
rights and duties of persons joined as parties. But the process
of distributing costs requires powers of administration and command that are administered by courts. Not even the United
States Supreme Court has said as yet that an advantage secured
by appropriating a lawyer's investment of time and effort in a
lawsuit produces personal liability in the taker.8 6 Recent cases
still refuse awards of counsel fees against disconnected litigants in
disconnected lawsuits, though their success has been assured
through stare decisis.1 7 The conception still survives that such
burdens can be cast on funds but not on people.
' Id. at 1458.
186 Indeed, Coleman v. United States, 152 U.S. 96 (1894), rather indicates the
contrary.
Forman v. Sewerage & Water Bd., iig La. 49, 43 So. 908 (I9o7), was an effort
by a lawyer who had been hired by the state Attorney General and succeeded in
the "gigantic" task, after a "mountain of work," of forfeiting the charter of a
waterworks company. This gave him no claim to a fee from the defendant, which
was organized a year later and which allegedly would have had to pay 2,000,000
dollars
to buy out the waterworks company.
87
Schleit v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 41o F.2d 26E (D.C. Cir. 1969)
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Whether the device of the fund should be altogether abandoned or replaced by other means in litigation whose aims are
different are questions for another time.
(lawyer hired by several airlines succeeded in invalidating airport charges imposed
on them and sought to recover from two other airlines that were released from
such charges as a result) ; Preston v. United States, 284 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. x96o)
(litigation brought on behalf of one member of an Indian tribe establishing that
the Department of the Interior was required to release to other members of the
tribe land held in trust for the tribe); Whittier v. Emmet, 281 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir.
ig6o), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 935 (296) (litigation by veterans established rights
of 8400 other veterans to government insurance refunds). See also Honda v.
Mitchell, 419 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (consent judgment secured at a rate for
conversion of Japanese yen that was later applied in favor of other yen creditors).

